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1Introduction
Of course anything ie possible in this world in v/hioh
wo live...but I say this ; th-j lik lihood that any
nation possessing these grout weapons of massive
destruction would use them in an attack, gPMI loss,
I think, every year. I believe that as thair under-
standing of thr*a gro#s, then the less the chance that
they would go on an adventure that brought these things
into play, because as I see it, any such operation is
Just another way of oonuiltting suicide*
••• . . ....Dwlght Eisenhower *
What President cisenhowar was describing in a press ocnference in
February of 1967 was a phenomenon which has come to be called the nuclear
stalemate, u condition brought about by the existence of parity in weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union,
preventing them from ''launching all-out war because each can force the
other to pay an exhorbitant prioe for victory. " The beginning of this
"stalemate w cocurred during the Truman administration in 1949, for in
that year the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, signifying the
end of the African nuclear monopoly. Uthln a few years, the Soviet
Jnion possessed a retaliatory capability which equalled. If it <.:id
not surpass, that of the United States. As a result, a stalemate
had
arisen in whioh neither state was willing to risk the destruction
a
nuclear war would bring. Added to this was the f*ot that
neither side
recognUed a oonaelllnjr. oausus belli , and thus recourse to majormm lesgaod
^-President Eisenhower, press conference, quoted in Kew
Y rk Times,
February 7, 1967, p. 12.
%ttnry Ussinger, Nuclear Weapo™ Foreign Polloy,
(Garden Cityi
V.oubleday, 1S57), p. 110.
2However, because the Soviets retained the idea of the inevitable
triumph of Communism over capitalism, it was very unlikely that they
would abandon their expansionistic aims. The more likely course for the
Communists to take in their quest for world domination would be mainly
through non-military (economic, political, social) means and by military
aggression short of total war, "confining their aggression to places
and oiroumstanoes in which war would not jeopardize objectives of sufficient
3immediate importance to warrant all-out retaliation..*" The phrase
"non-military means military aggression short of total war" may refer
to indirect methods of diplomacy, economic pressures, propaganda, sub-
version, infiltration, insurrection, obstruction, planned mischief,
underground war, sabotage, intimidation, armed threats, limited war, and
war by proxy."4 It may even be indirect aggression where the USSR
does not even appear as & contestant, but supplies one side with materiel
and technical advice.
Although the ultimate objectives of Soviet policy are inflexible,
the tactics by which they may be achieved are very flexible and are
governed by a kind of opportunism — one step baokward in order to take
two forward. The communists have shown this ability to retreat as well
ad advance many times in recent history. They did it in Spain before
World War II, they were defeated in Greece in 1947, and they backed down
in Berlin in 1948. In the words of one analyst, "they have tried to
control the use of force because in most cases they have seen a specific
Robert Osgood, Limited V'ar , (Chioagoi University of Chicago, 1957),
p. 6.
4Brigadier C. V. Barclay, as quoted in Theodore Ropp, .Var in the
Modern ttorld, (Durham* Duke, 1959), pp. 380-81.
3advantage in the exorcise of restraint
Yet, the fact remains that the forces of Communism are a , war with
the Free World, through subversion, espionage and small scale war and
will remain so until their goals are achieved or they are defeated,
What this discussion is implying is that because of the existence of
the "nuclear stalemate * the Communist forces may not resort to total
war to aohieve their aims, but instead will use limited forms of aggression
in their struggle.
Karl von Clausewita in his treatise On ftf had indicated that war
need not always be total, but may at times appear in a limited form.
First, limited war would oocur whenever the political tensions or the
political aims involved were small. In his words,
A war need not ...always be fought until one of the
parties is overthrown, and we may suppose that when
the motivies and tensions are weak, a slight, scarcely
peroeptable probability is in itself enough to move that
side to which it is unfavoraole to give T.vay. Now, were the
other side convinced of this beforehand, he woulc;, nat-
urally, strive for this probability only, instead of first
going out of his way to attempt to effect u complete
overthrow of the enemy* 6
It would appear that this condition has not been fulfilled during the
present period sinoe political tensions are not "small" and the
Communist political aims involve the complete victory of communism over
capitalism, with the struggle ending only when this aim is realized.
However, Claueewitz's second oondition for limited war may very
well be applicable to the situation faoing the world today. According
William Kaufmann, "Limited War", in William Kaufmann, editor,
Military Policy and National Security , (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956), p. 103.
6Karl von Clausewitz, On ^ar , translated by 0. J. Matthijs Jolles,
(Washington; Combat Forces Press, 1S53), p. 21 (Bk. I, Ch. II).
to Clauiarwitz *We see.. .that in wars in which the one side oannot
completely i isarn the other, the motives to peace will rise and fall on
both sides aocording tc the probability of future success and the
expenditure of force required. w? This statement implies that war will
be United when the overthrow of the eneny oannot be conceived of or
oan be approaohed only in an indirect way. Although this statement
was premised on tho insuf fioienoy of the military means, it can also
be valid when the means may bo sufficient to overthrow the ene^y, but
would produce universal disaster, "A viotory robbed of its meaning
is no viotory at all."""" »7hat oannot bo conoeived of is the oorupleto
protection of one's oountry, and as long as this condition exists,
the possibility of total war (premeditated; is minimised.
The purpose of this paper will be to determine *hat effect the
above conclusions have had on American military strategists and politic*
leaders. It will mainly be a study of attitudes and the reasons behind
th«m« The proposition set forth is that in tho present period limited
war Is more likely to ooour than total war due to the "nuclear stalemate
and the inability of either cf the t\to opposing foroes to completely
insure its own protection so that it could successfully win a total war.
This implies that the United States, while maintaining an adequate
atomic retaliatory foroe to insure protection against total war, must
also bo adequately prepared to fight limited wars should they ocour.
7Ibld «
8
"Li mited *art the prospects and possibilities.
" Aray Information
Digest, Vol. XIII. June, 1958. p. IU This idoa aay also found in
fl.TUhfels. "Clausewits," in Edward *eade Sari, inkers of modern
trategy
.
(rinoeton: Princeton -niveraity Press, 1844,; ?. 109.
5This proposition has become the subject of a heated debate within
military- and political circles and involves much mora than purely
strategic considerations. As will be shown, it involves the desire
of the Armed Service to maintain their prestige and even build up their
own "empires." The Air i-oroe has a vostad interest in securing funds
for total war preparation and maintaining its budget. The /(ray and
*avy desire to have both a limited war and a total war capability.
This means a greater budget and more power for each. The airoraft
industry and part of the missile industry have a vested interest in a
polioy for total war because of the defense contracts they reoeive.
The same holds true for the snail anas and tactical missile industries
which have a vested interest in a polioy designed to combat limited war.
Some companies may provide for both a total war and a limited war policy
and thus have an Interest in seeing that both policies are followed.
Politically the Democratic Congress uses defense policy as a partisan
weapon to attack the policies of the aepublioan administration. The
Democrats may argue that not enou . h has jsen done to combat limitod
wars, and thus the policies of the administration are inadequate.
This also involves a fight between Congress and the administration in
determining what constitutes an adequate defense posture. At the MM
time the administration recognises the need for defense against both
types of war and contends it is beinp aaintained.
In 1967 there began a rash of books and articles dealing with this
subject led by Henry "Kissingers huclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and
Robert Osgood's Limited .Var » These books have been followed by It.
General (ret.) James Gavin's var and Peaoe in the Space Age (1958),
6Oskar Morgenstern's The Question of National Defense (1959), and General
(ret.) itexwell Taylor's The uncertain Trumpet (i960). These book*
have allotted a considerable response from public opinion and seem to
be the major Amerioan sources on limited warfare to this date. Because
these authors tend toward generalities and make many value judgments,
the books do not present a true picture of the debate over limited war.
Furthermore, they present only one side of the debate—the limitod war
side. Thus, in order to show a clearer picture of the attitudes of
the nation's polioy-aiakers on the subject of limited war, the Congress ional
Rooord
, bervioe journals, popular periodicals, anu x.hc .iev York Tines
will also oa used.
This paper covers the period 1957 to the Eisenhower budget message
for i' iscul Y ur 1961. The 1957 date was chosen because it marks an
upsurge In the debate over defense policy centering around the necessity
of preparing to det 3r or to fight limited wars. The 1960 date was
chosen as the other limit to the thesis because it .ijarks the last
Major effort by the present administration on the matter of defense.
Consequently, a brief history of the American attitude toward limited
war up to 1957 will be dealt with as a background to the study.
^s previously mentioneu, this will be priroarily a study of attitudes
and the often contradictory reasons behind them. At the same tiaa
the difference batwsan words *nu deods must be noted, for often public
pronouncement is for public consumption only and is made for expediency's
sake. An example of this is the iiffereuco between tho testimony of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Appropriations Committees of
Congress and their ststtenants nw.de in service journals - their own
'unofficial" views. Xhere also say be differences between the attitude
of the administration toward the need to provide for limited war forces
and the aotual policy
.
This will be analyzed by showing first the
attitude of the administration and then by studying the defense budgets
for the f iaoul years 1959, 1SSQ, and 1361. The same will be done with
Congress. Because the inclusion of expenditures fcr space program
tends to complicate the debate, and since the spaoe program has been
taken out of the hands of the military and is still In the early stages
of development (as far as Lnaediate strategic use is concerned)* its
relation to limited war capabilities ana government policy vdll not be
dealt with thoroughly.
In concluding the thesis an attempt will be made to clarify the
position of American thinking and policy on the concept of limited war
in order to determine what effects, if any, the doctrine has had on
actual policy-, to ascertain why the administration has or has not adopted
limited war capabilities, and to decide what future action, if any, the
Government must take in order to remedy the situation. In this respect,
it is hoped that this paper may hare some original value*
8Chapter I
The United States and Limited War
In the United State6 down to the earlier yeare of the 20th century
there had always been an intimate relation between war and domestic
politics. In fact, every war the United States had fought in the Western
Hemisphere was a limited war* James Knox Polk in the mid-1840 1 s "could
manipulate hiB war powers quite skillfully as a means of securing both
political and national objectives which seamed important to him, M*
For Iincoln the Civil .Var was as much a political as it was a military
operation. lie used military violence only to secure definite political
results. In the Spanish-American War, MoKinley was able to use war
as an instrument of politics and policy. However, by Wilson's time
Var was.«.so terrible and desperate a recourse that it could no longer
be used...»to achieve limited national aims or make good narrow aims
of foreign policy... It could only be taken up for the grandest of total
objectives, such as "making the world safe for democray" mm specifically,
American demooraoy. This oan be said to have been a political aim,
but not in the same sense used by Polk or iicKinley who used war to gain
specific national aims. The grand objectives desired by Wilson were
neither specific nor limited and thus are not comparable to the aims
sought by Polk or MoKinley. Moreover, Wilson was forced to use policy
as an instrument of war, while Polk and MoKinley used was us an instrument
of polioy. They had a definite policy in mind and willingly used war
to gain their ends. Wilson was forced to go to war to achieve his desired
goals and thus his polioy became an instrument of the war itself*
^Walter Willis, Arms and tou (New York: New American Library of World
Literature, Inc. , 1356 J, p. 522.
£Ibid.
9The American people began to view war us a thing la itself rather
than as the oontinuation of policy and diplomacy. It became something
to afcolleh, or If fangs*, a means of punishing an enemy who had disturbed
the peaoe* To American thinking war and peaoe became two diameterioally
opposed states and eaon was suspended durin.c the period of the other.5
Much of this attitude was fostered by ^resident Wilson himself in Viorld
*«ar I. Before 1917 he tried to get u permanent peace settlement and
sent his personal advisor. Colonel Edward House, on peaoe missions to
Europe in 1915 and 1915, but nothing came of the negotiations. Again,
after his election in 1916, Wilson drafted a note appealing to the
belligerents to state the reasons for which they were fighting the war.
Germany replied, but the Allies were unwilling to state their own war
aims. Then on January ::2, 1S17, ilson ..uve his famous speech to the
Senate oalling for the establishment of a League of Nations to bring
about world accord and warning the belligerents that only "peaoe without
victory'' would bring a peraansnt settlement. The speech furthered
«ilson*s leadership in the world, but had no effect on the belligerents,
especially the Allies, who could not afford a stalemate.* This final
rebuke together with Germany's resumption of its policy of unrestricted
submarine warfare forced Alison to yield to the sword, lie then turned
to the other extreme and attempted to et the war over as fast as
possible used the maximum of foroe on the grounds that total victory
was nooessary to make the world safe for cemooraoy. It was an attitude
which, onoe the war was won, caused the American public to withdraw
^Osgood, op. oit >, p. 29.
*Thomus Bailey, A Dlplon^tic history of the Amerloan feople, (lew
York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, inc.] TJoO, pp. 535-56 and 640-41.
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from the international scon© on the grounds that since victory was
complete, there wuld be no more war, Military thinking became entirely
defensive, and prior to ^orld «?ar II American thinking was completely
in necorc *ith the idea that the United States ooula rcmin out of war
by hawing an impregnable defense.
It was HmtSJ :»ar II which showed that the United States could not
keep herself isolated from world events, and it showed that American
security could be endangered by upheavals vVerseas. The crusading
character of Aorld i»ar II instilled the idea of total victory into
laerioan strategic thinking along with approval of waging all-out
nuclear war. After all, to -v.-jrio n thinking the -nited States possessed
the greatest military machine in the world at the end of the war, and
the atomic bombs dropped on Japan were the perfect reminder that the
United States had at last the ultimate weapon. #ar was no longer viewed
as an instrument of polioy by the American people j it was an end in
itself.
It has been claimed that American military thinking was actually
paralyzed by the atomic bomb, ana that th<3 lessons to be gained from
Vsorld Viar II
6
were quiokly forgottan by the Truman administration.
The successes of the A-bombs in Japan seemed to validate the old . ouhet
theory of strategic bombing — the actual success of which Lii .orld <«.r II
was dubious,
Sjamos kavin, aar and ^eaoe in the Space Age , (Bew Yorkt Harper, 1958),
pp. 92-112. Aaoa^ those lessons cited
1 by G .vin were the use of tactical
air support and troop transport, airborne operations, amphibious operations,
carrier task force operations, and air mobility.
6Beoau«o the Japanese conveyed peace overtures to the Russians in
April of 1945, there Is strong evidence that the war could huve been wen
without resort to the atomic bomb, and that it was really the destruction
of the Japanese merchant fleet that defeated Japan. See Harold Vinaoke^
a History or the i^.r -^st in cd.srn York; Appleton-Century-
Croftes, Inc., 1950 J, pp.
This theory saw air power as strategic — *a mc-azse of striking at the
enezny homeland, where the target* would bo the civilian population and
productive plant, the very sources of military power, n7 Furthermore,
"the nation that developed the greatest air offensive poorer would win
(the next war), very likely in a matter of hours,*8
Thus the United States began to prepare for future wars by building
up a strong nuclear striking force. In truth, this was a very feasible
and logical policy, for the Soviet Union was beginning to consolidate
its
v
>ias in uurope and *us looked upon as the prime threat to American
security. The Truaan administration felt that it was not paralysed
by the atomic bosab but wis acting to deter further conquest by the
forces of Communism in the form of a surprise attack. Furthermore,
through such moans as the Marshall Plan and the Truaan Doctrine, actual
uses of limited techniques to oosibat CosEnunisai, the administration was
trying to make Europe strong enough to resist the Soviet advances.
The specific military doctrine was actually incorporated into a foreign
policy of contining Communist expansion (although the administration
did net explicitly admit it). The object of the policy was to
....keep the soviet sphere of control from expanding
beyone its postwar boundaries by building up local
situations of strength and by demonstrating a capacity
to moot force with counterforce. 9
One of the sseans or aaaa^llahl&g this objective wus the deterranee
cf voasuaiat agression by America's capacity to retail*^* Inst
7Roger Hilaaan, "Strategic iioctrlnea for Limited ir," in William
Kaufinann, op. cit
., p. 45.
8Gavin, op. cit ., p. SS.
60srood, op. olt ., p. 142. This was the original idea behind the
policy of containment deviaed by George F. Xennan.
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aggression by means of total war. 10 Lven though this was only on© of the
ways in which containment was to work, it tended to become the principal
characteristic of American military policy prior to the Korean War,
although the Marshall Plan and the Truman Uootrine were examples of the
use of limited non-military techniques.
There felt several reasons for the success of the idea of relying
primarily upon air power. The most frequently cited reason was the
threat of Soviet expansion, but there were other, more important, reasons
which were not as apparent as the Soviet threat. Probably, the most
important of these reasons was the new-found power of the United States
Air Force, which had pained great prestige with the advent of the atomic
bomb and even had become a separate service in 1947. Air Force high
brass were no* interested in placing the iiir Force on at least an equal
footing with the other services. The success of the bombs on Japan
helped the Air force expand and started the groundwork for its later
rise to a position dominating the other services. The aircraft industry
probably played an important part in this rise in an effort to secure
greater profits than it would have if a more flexible policy were
followed. Such a policy offered smaller sacrifices for the average
citizen, and thus he felt that a large Air Force with fewer personnel
and huge weapons and preferable to a large standing Army and Navy.
Thus, by 1953 the Air Force had a personnel strength of 977,000 and a
m 11budget of over $20 billion.
^Ibid., p. 110 g The other means to contain Communist advances were
meeting force with oounterforoe in a local and limited aotion, and
building situations of strength overseas through economic, technical,
and military aid.
Encyclopedia Americana , (Washington: Amerioanna ^orp.), Vol. 1, p. 288.
Even as early as 1950, the Air Force had only 182,000 less
men than did the Army. 12
This policy was criticized by Secretary of State George Marshall,
who saw that the United States was increasing its commitments overseas
without providing for adequate forces to back them up, except for the
atomic retaliatory forces. Aocording to him, "We are playing with fire
while we have nothing with which to put it out.*13 Even he was not
without blame, however, as he played a key role in letting the China
"fire" get out of hand, as his negotiating mission failed. Then in
1949 the explosion of the Russian atomic bomb led the United States
to build larger retaliatory weapons in order to stay ahead of the
Russians. Thus, by 1950 the doctrines of total war and large scale
nuclear retaliation tended to be the major guiding forces in American
strategic thinking.
It was the Korean war which forced the administration to take
notice of the possibilities of limited aggressions occurring under the
umbrella of nuclear deterrents. The war was a shock to the planners
because it defied all previous American strategic thinking. The attack
did not come upon the United States, nor was it initiated by the Soviet
Union (directly). Korea was not even included in the American defense
perimeter. "Years of propaganda had pretty well convinced Americans
by 1950 that air power was the primary, if not almost the only, expressi
of modern military power."
14
There was no doubt that the North Korean
l gCongressional Reoord , Vol. 105, pt. 13, p. 16788.
13George Marshall as quoted in Millis, op, oit ., p. 282. A more
comprehensive statement of Marshall* s position may be found in James
Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries , (New York: Viking, 1951).
l4Gavin, op. oit
., p. 297.
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invasion had caught the American Army completely by surprise in spite
of intelligence reports concerning the threat of *ar, for the amount
of troops and equipment in Korea had greatly deolined since the end
of World Aar II.
In spite of the fact that American strategic thinking was geared
to fight total, all-out wars, tiie administration did resort to limited
war, since the issues at stake were not viewed as being great enough
to justify total war. The administration felt, contrary to the wishes
of General MacArthur, that the war should not spread beyond the boundaries
of Korea itself, and thus the idea that it was feasible to fight limited
war began to take hold in administration oiroles.
*ith this in mind a study known as "Projeot Vista"16 was undertaken
under government sponsorship to conduct a broad study of ground and
taotioal warfare in order to improve the country's capacity to fight
limited wars. The results of the study, formulated by Dr. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, were a desire to bring the battle back to the battlefield,
as it was felt that the more dangerous problem facing the United States
was not general war but limited war. Thus the recommendations of the
study sought to improve the United war capabilities of each of the
services, 4' There has been no official mention of the results of the
study, but it is signifio&nt that the administration thought enough of
the implications of the Korean >V&r to initiate such a study.
* 5Projeot Vista was undertaken at the California Institute of
Technology in 1951 under the auspices of the Army, Wavy, and Air Force
to conduct a broad study of ground and tactical warfare. It was ohairei
by Cr, Lloyd Dubridge and consisted of Bra, William Fowler, Robert B&oher,
C, C. Furaass* Charles Lauristen, Clark illikan, J, Robert Oppenheiasr,
and H, ?• Robertson,
16Gavin op, cit ,, pp. 131-35,
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The Korean War showed tho defense planners that the Cotonunista
could and *ould resort to measures less than total war to achieve limited
ends, and the United States showed that It was capable of meeting such
*6£re»eion on liaited terms without expending its total productive
resources. Yat, after the Korean War the administration indicated that
the prime threat to American security was still that of a surprise attack
by the Soviet Union* and policy was geared to meat this threat, further-
more, in 1954 when Secretary of State Dulles indicated that massive
retaliation would be the prime factor in American defense policy, he
ignored the need for a strategy of flexibility to meet the Communist
threat. In a speech on January 12, 1954, he declared;
So long as our basic policy oonoepts were unclear, our
military leaders could not be selective in buildin,
our military power. If an enemy could pick his time
and place and method of war fare—and If our policy was
to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by
direct and local opposition—then *re needed to be
ready to fight in the Arctic, and in the Tropics j
in Asia, the Near East, and in Suropoj by the sea,
by land, and in the air* with old weapons and with
new weapons....
3ut beforo military planning oould be changed,
the Resident and his advisers, as represented by
the national Security Council, had to take some
basio polioy decisions. This has been done.
The basic decision was to depend pri-uarily upon
a freat capacity to retaliate, instantly, by
juans and at places of our own choosing. New the
fepartaect of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
can shape our military establishment to fit what is
our policy, instead of having to try to be ready
to meet the energy's choices.
™
John foster Dulles, quoted in Jte-jr York ibaes, January 13, 1954, p. ?•
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Out of this statement grew the doctrine of tussive retaliation
and the military policy known as the Htw Look*" The aim of this
policy was to place a greater emphasis on the use of atomic retaliatory
power and reduce conventional forces. According to Secretary of Cefenae
Charles Wilson in tfaroh of 1954:
••the integration of new weapons into military planning
oreates new relationships between man and materi41 which
oiaphasites air power and permit overall economies in
the use of manpower*
The fisoal year 1956 budget incorporates the new
air force objective and continues a rapid buildup
of air strength, and the creation, toaintenace, and
full exploitation of modern air power. ..
As we incre ase the striking power of our combat
forces by the application of technological advances
and new weapons and by the continuing growth of
air power, the total number of military personnel
can be reduced.*®
This was a policy primarily dependent upon massive retaliation oap-
abilities at the expense of forces to meet looal aggression. It also
followed the policy of Secretary of State Dulles, a policy v^hich
ignored flexibility to meet all threats. This policy also implied
that future wars would be fought in the air and there would be no
snore land wars such as vorea and Indochina, rurthermcre, the attitude
of tfilson was that by building up forces for deterring all-out war,
the capability to fight liaited war would also be created.
;Iowever, Admiral Radford, a staunch believer in massive retaliation,
had stated earlier that the United States still had to be prepared to
fight "lMMff military actions short of all-out war," and President
Lisonhower assured planners that local wars could be waged on the
Charles Wilson, quoted in *0* York 1 lives , ^aroh 16, 1964, p. 1.
1SAdniral Charles Radford, Mew York Times , December 13, 1953,
IV, p. 5.
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"fringe or periphery of our interests. ,,2° Thus, although the first
priority was placed upon retaliatory forces, limited wars were postulated
as a definite strategic possibility. Then the National Security Council
presented l report in 1955 in which "recognition was given for the
first time to the possibility of a doctrine of mutual deterrence and
the importance in suoh a period for the United States to have versatile,
?]
ready forces to cope with limited aggression.
In 1966 General Taylor as Army Chief of Staff proposed the adoption
of a new military program by which the United States could maintain
the capacity to fight limited wars and at the same time maintain an
effective and credible deterrent to all-out war. The program called
for forces speoially equipped to meet either contingency, an adequate
atomic deterrent, foreign military and eoonomio aid to countries to
build up their indigenous forces, and the application of graduated force.
According to General Taylor this program #ould be suitable for flexible
application to unforeseen situations and thus could not be geared to
any one single weapons system, strategic concept, or combination of
allies
i
22 What this amounted to was a policy of containing the
Communist threat by being ready to oppose aggression Vith a variety
of means under a variety of circumstances".
23 This included a capacity
to fight limited war as well as general war. It also meant a capacity
2-Wxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet , (New York: Harper, 1959),
pp. 22-27.
22Ibid., pp. 31-37
230sgood, op. cit ., p. 235.
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to deter the enemy from starting 1baited wars, or to win them quickly
in order to prevent a *.)iooe::teal attrition or involvement in an expanding
conflict which may ?ra* into the general war we want to avoids
Thie policy closely paralleled statements made by President Eisenhower
and members of his administration since 1966. Yet it *as used by
General Taylor as a criticism directed toward administration policies.
Certain factors enter into thie apparent discrepancy. One is that
there may be a difference between public statements made by administration
officials and their true feelings and actual policy decisions. On the
other hand, criticise of the Administration's policy from service chiefs
could result from the desire to protect their own "empires" and the
prestige of their services* There is also the possibility that the
criticisms were |aided by pure strategic considerations. What is more
than likely is that this discrepancy is a result of all three factors.
Thus, from the end of <orld War II through 1856 American military
strategy was formed under the thusab cf air power and in the belief
that a policy of massivo retaliation was sufficient to deter any
tt£* rossor from waging all-out WU on the United States. It was felt
that such a policy would also prevent the outbreak of any local or
limited war. Such a policy was satisfactory totthe Air iorce, since it
relied primarily upon air po;*er, and it was favored by the administration,
since it offered a chance to eoono:.i^e in the defense budget. This was
true of the Truman administration up to the Korean >»ar as well as the
Eisenhower administration from 1953 to 1957. Criticism oasa mainly from
the Army and Navy, which felt that they were being flighted, and from
Democratic Congressmen and Senators In their attacks on the Republican
administration from 1953 to 1957.
Taylor, loo* alt.
Chapter II
The Debate on Limited W&r
The Armed Services
1
The period 1S57 to the present has been marked by the continuance
of a heated debate in the Pentagon, the administration, and Congress
over the status of American military strategy. In this age of mutual
nuolear stalemate the fear of nuclear devastation tsnde to impose a
decree of caution upon the protagonists, forcing thes to weigh carefully
the risks involved in starting a nuclaar holocaust. For this reason
the capability of raassive retaliation is essential to any defense or
security policy. Such a capability includes long range boabers and
ballistic missiles, military bases at homo and overseas, mobile naval
talk foroes, tactical aircraft and troops, and a multiplicity of weapons,
Essentially, it is a doctrine of defense power — the ability to strike
baok at the enemy with such destructive foroe that he will be deterred
fro:n launching an attack. This is essentially the military policy
followed by the United States at this time.
let it can be added that the ability to deter the Soviets from
starting a general war by having a defensive force of long-range nuolear
firepower is not enough to detsr then from starting small limited wars.
What is needed are foroes oapable of meeting all kinds of threats. *»e
must be able to deliver a big punch or a gentle tap."
1 Such a capacity
la needed because the enemy may resort to small, limited wars to gain
his ends. Xhis type of conflict does not involve the use of the nuclear
Hanson Baldwin, Nev; York llnies , August 18, 1957, p. 68.
retaliatory foroe because the objectives sought at the time are not
great enough to justify the unleashing of these foroes. The ohief
point made by the supporters of this view, namely the Army, Navy, and
the Democratic members of Congress, is that we have been increasing our
power to deter the Communists from starting a general war by building
up our nuclear retaliatory capacity at the expense of our conventional
capability, while the Soviets have been increasing their nuclear capacity
without weakening their conventional capability.
This has been the view held by the officials of the U # S, Army and,
recently, the Navy, In January of 1958 Secretary of the Army Wilber
Bruoker testified before the House Armed Services Committee that in
his mind there was no doubt that the Soviet Union was planning a series
of "nibbling" wars, since they were maintaining an army of 2.5 million
men* "What they are going to do," he testified, "is keep nibbling away,
as they have in the Mid-East, foment trouble in Indonesia and Syria and
these other places around the world, and one by one drag them under the
Iron Curtain by hook or crook. .Unless we have a force ready to drop
or get in there and do something about it, that is the best way to start
one of those global things." 2 This same opinion was also expressed by
General Jiaxwell Taylor when he was Army Chief of Staff. He declared
that "our (the Army's) major concern, of course, is to prevont war. But
if the Communists are not convinced that we will fight if necessary,
our deterrent becomes invalid. If we demonstrate our readiness to use
effective force to put down local aggression, it will give credulity
to our general war deterrent posture. Thus, while we should never
2
Wilber Bruoker, quoted in New York Times, January 25, 1958, p. 2.
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seek limited wars, we must bear in mind the broud significance of our
reactions to limited aggression in terms of communicating our will and
determination to the potential foe,"5
At no time have Artay officials denied the need for a nuclear retalia-
tory capacity.4 They bcliev;.- that we now have an "overkill" capacity
(the ability to destroy Kussian cities many times over) in the use of
nuclear retaliatory weapons. As long as we can destroy a city with one
bomb or missile, it is not neaessary to have five or six to do the same
Job, they reason. What is needed is to divert funds from the massive
retail lation field to strengthen the capability to fight non-nuoloar war
or to create small tactical siae (short range, "clean") nuclear weapons
that would have only local and limited effects and would not incur the
danger of spreading the war,5
Moreover, General Taylor hat pointed out that these wars need not
be short nor small. According to him, "by striking a statistical manpower
balance of all 17 limited wars (since 1945? see chart on page 25a) one
findi that they have averaged about 2:, years in duration and nearly
SOqpOO men engaged. Often significant military effort has been required
to bring these limited wars to an end.
Following this line of thinking Major General John Daley, the Array 1 s
director of special weapons, has suggested that the 'suicide" aspects of
^Maxwell Taylor, "On limited war," Army Information digest Vol. XIII,
June, 1956, p, 4,
Secretary 3ruoker testified before the Senate Armed Servioes Conmlttee
in January. 1358# "While all of us recognize the primacy of nuclear retal-
iation as the major deterrent to general war, we must not, in our seal to
provide this capability, neglect to meet the force requirements for
limited war," New York limes , January 23, 1958, p, 1,
°hanson Baldwin, &m York Tjnoo, May £5, 1358, p. 28
6
Maxwell Taylor, "Improving our capabilities for limited war, * Army_
Infornation •-ifoet . Vol. 14, February, 1969, p. 3.
thermonuclear weapons might cause a new oonf liot to follow the pattern of
World War II. Thus, he has arrived at the possibility of three types of
war ooourring — "total thermonuclear war, limited war, general war of
great extent involving atomic weapons but still not thermonuclear megaton
suicide, the oomplete exchange of nuclear stockpiles."7 Like General
Taylor, General Daley also pointed out that limited wars need not be
small. In General Daley's mind the big war involving nuolear weapons
and huge foroes but not resulting in thermonuclear suioide is the type
of war most often overlooked. According to him, "a nation prepared for
a little limited war or the Armageddon of thermonuclear war could still
be ruined by this general war particularly if the nation failed to
provide for the mobilization of reserve strength in time of crisis."8
The Army has acknowledged that the United States has forces designed
to meet all these threats. In the area of general war, General Taylor
has cited the atomio retailiatory bomber and missile foroes, continental
air defense foroes, the Navy's anti-submarine warfare foroes, and civil
defense. These foroes are necessary but do not contribute to a capability
for fighting limited war in his view. In this area (of limited war)
the United States does have impressive assets including the Tactical
Air Command,^ the Navy's carrier forces, the strategic air and sea lift
forces, and most of the Army and all of the Marines.*0 Aocording to
7Major General John D^ley, quoted in New York Times
,
July 4, 1960, p. 3,
8
Ibid
.
^Aocording to the Brigadier General Clifton von Kann (Director of
Army Aviation), "If there is one Air Foroe program that the Army is
dedicated to — it is TAC. The Army holds that the TAC mission is one of
the most important in the military establishment." ^rmy, flavy, Air Force
Journal vol. XCVII, October 31, 1359, p. 2,
10 „
Maxwell Taylor, "Improving our capabilities for limited war. Army
Information uigest, vol. 14, February, 1359, pp. 4-6.
General Taylor the Army was determined to support emergenoy operations
uoh as Lebanon through the Strategic Army ^orps, a foroe specially
designed to meet the "initial requirements* of limited or general war
anywhere in the world. Ihis force could also be reinforoed by redeploy-
ment of forces already overseas. However, in his opinion "such redeploy-
ment of our overseas foroes weakens their capabilities in thd areas
from which they are deployed at tho very tiiae that world tensions are
increased. Hence in rnany cases it would be necessary to repla.ee them
by additional foroes from COSUS (Continental united States)"1
This would necessitate a larger standing Anay with adequate modern
weapons. In order to meet this condition General I jylor outlined a five
point program in »id-195S in order for the country to meet more effectively
the possibilities of limited war. These five points included! 1) moderni-
sation of military equipment applicable to limited war situations,
2) improvement of the strategic mobility of limited war foroos, 3/ the
pre-planned use of air and sea lift necessary to move these foroes,
4) an expanded program for joint planning and training of the elements
of limited war forces, and b) pablio recognition of our increased
1?
capability or u*rinw with the '"challenge" of limited war. Such a
prorrai:., he f«slt, wouli zreatly add to the nation's assets for fighting
limited war and would add oredulity to the deterrent posxur* of the
country.
In order to aalce the Army an efficient fighting force with Htf
ability to fight general atomic war or limited nuclear or conventional
11
x/efens
12
war a reorganisation of the Army's structure was undertaken in 1957.
The key element in this reorganisation was the battle group ( a scaled
down regiment) in the new division structure. These battle groups would
be administratively self-contained units thus enabling a wide dispersal
of units on the offense and defense. Such a struoture was necessary to
prevent the appearance of massed targets to the enemy on the battlefield.
The four major principles in this new structure were: l) the ready
adaptability of units to the requirements of the atomic battlefiled,
2) the pooling of higher echelons of command, 3) an increased span of
control, 4) the adaptability of new equipment. The new infantry division
was souled down to 13,748 men (previously 17,460) with five battle
groups. Eaoh battle group was to contain five rifle companies equipped
with mortar 8 and armored personnel carriers, a unit of light tanks, and
assorted light artillery. The division also maintained a tank battalion,
a transport battalion, and assorted artillery inoluding 105 mm. howitzers,
8 inoh howitzers, and Honest John rockets. Thus the Army's infantry
division could be used in part to oope with situations short of general
war and also be adaptable to the requirements of general war. The same
could be said of the armored division which declined in strength but
received more airoraft. It was believed that armor would play an
increased role in nuclear warfare because of its mobility and the
protection afforded by armor plate from blast and fallout. The airborne
division beoame completely air transportable using only one-half the
13lift of the old division. In this way the Army felt it would have
the forces necessary to meet all military situations. This opinion was
13
"Army describes new pentomio division. Army, Navy, Air Force
Journal, vol, XCIV, Maroh 30, 1957, pp. 1-2.
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euafcied up by General Bruoe Clark, the commanding general of the Continental
Arsay Comand, who stated:
Our preparedness program Is designed for multiple
posibilities — not chained to a single concept of the
enemy's intentions, ffe are preparing to survive an
attempt at a nuclear knock-out and fight on with what-
ever air and navel support reiaains. We are preparing
for a general war — one in which our national survival
is directly at stake. And we are preparing to win the
ultimate battle of euoh a war on the ground where people
liva. are preparing to snuff out bruahfire wars
before they can gain ground
,
gravity or intensity. And
we are seeking the modern sea and air lift to answer an
alara anywhere in the world.
*
4
Thus, according to the Army all kinds of war are possible* and the
Army has to be prepared to meet them all.
Seneral Bruoe Clark, ^Limited war: where do they stand?',
Army, Navy, Air Foroe Register and defense Tines
, vol. 80, J!ay, 23, 1959,
p. ?4.
"flara since 1945
Poa
Forces involved in 1000 »B
Date .Vur Total ^and Voroea
1. 1946-47 Indonesian titfp Neth* Indo. 14U 140 130 140
2. 1245-49 Chinese Cirll Har ChXats
.
Ch^om. XOOO loOC lo?2
3. 1946*54 Malayan Aar UX Coirta, If!I/O IS 160 10
•
1146*49 Creek Viar Greece Rebels cl 1 mi191 *% c?0
5. 1947-4S Kashmir i isputo India Fkkie. Q7 oo
6. 1946-64 Indoohlna 3ar Franca ytetit. son OcO
7. 1948-49 Arab-Israeli 3or Israel Arabs U JW£a iU u
e.• 1950-53 Korean **ar 01 Co^nnu £70 1 1 7ft DO*« Tic.*
• 1964 Guatemala Revolt Govt • Rebels 5
1C. 1955 Argentine Revolt Govt • Rebels 16 40 15 5
11. 1953-68 Algerian Insurrec* France Rebels 490 so WW 30
12. 1956 Sinai Campaign Israel ^gypt 80 35 60 35
13. 1956 HUffSe Sues Seiaure UX-Fr. £*;ypt 99.5 35 60 35
14. 1957 Musoat-Ctean OK Rebels 2.4 0.3 1.6 0.3
16. 1956 Bulgarian ^uypres. Rebels USSR 40 80 40 70
16. 1956 Taiwan Straits US-Ch«. Ch.C. 200 195 88 135
17. 1953 Lebanon-Jordan US-JJK Rebels ra \m 16 11
18. 195S-59 Cuba B,tlsta Castro 43 6-8 35 6-8
Chart presented by Secretary of the Army VJilber firuoker and made public
i.: ;tgv; I i.:^s 0 January 23, 1859, p. 7»
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The attitude of the 'Jnitoa States Havy toward limited war has
undergone setae changes during the period 1367-1359. As long as
Admiral Arthur Radford was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Irnvy supported the policy of massive retaliation. According, to
Admiral Radford thore was no ohan*re in the world situation in 1957 j
there was no nuolear stalemate, "There has been no change in concept.
The basio problem has not changed. If you hare a little war, you want
to win it as soon as possible. You don't want to drag it out."*5
This attitude changed with Admiral R^dforJ's retirement, which
left Adrairai isrloi^h Burke as the only SJavy meruber of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Admiral Burke, together with General Randolph UeC Pate
of the Marines and most of the naval staff, have been strong supporters
of the need to build forces capable of coping with limited war situations.
Like the Army, the liavy has maintained the importance of having forces
to deal with general war. According to Vice Admiral !« V. Davis,
Deputy Chief of Saval Operations, as a nation we have no alternative
but to aaintain the ability to det.r aa^or nuclear war. The primary
element must be u. capability for rapid and oertain retailiation which
no enemy can persuade himself that he can stop, either by perfecting
hie defenses or by surprise attach on our scans of affective retaliation.
Severtheleea, the Navy has offered criticisms of the nuclear
retaliatory buildup. ?t«e Admiral I <*vis voiced the opinion that Ve oust
also provide the means of deterring cr defeating local aggression.
Mattel Arthur Radford, news conference, jg York Time* ,
August 16, 1SS7, ?. £•
16
Vice Admiral « V. Davis, "The Savy in limited w*r% Ordnance,
vol. 42, !<« JCllj ?• (Wi
To this we must provide weapons, and techniques of delivering them,
which will not result in the expansion of the limited action into some-
thing larger and more serious," 17 This would require in his opinion a
versatile foroe which oould use nuclear or conventional weapons and
could get to the seene quickly. Admiral 3urke has often expressed the
same opinion. He has stated before the defense subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee, "I think we do have too muoh retaliatory
power and I thinic that we should put more money into limited (war)
capability. m18 Later in an adcrese before the Kaval .sar Col la go in
April of 1959, Admiral Burke criticized our nuoloar build-up as a means
of preventing both general and United wars. He stated that the "pre-
paredness for all-out attaok has been 'over-aocomjlished.* What is
needed is to widen our sights for adequate preparedness against the more
probable oourses of action that fall far below the flash point of general
war.*** A« Secretary of the flavy, Thoaas Gates had also maintained the
need for a military strategy oapable of meeting all contingencies. In
a speeoh before the Navy League in &Ly, 1959, he declared that a major
war was unthinkable because of the huge destruction it would cause,
thus openin. the way for limited Coxanunist aggressions. In his words,
"•••we should drive home to the other services and the public the real
possibilities of limited war and of the inevitable continuance of the
cole war. People in all places should be made aware of the unchanged
17 Ibid.
18
Admiral Arloigh Burke, quoted in New York Times , *aroh 31, 1959, p. 1.
Admiral Burke as quoted in jg York Times, April 8, 1959, p. 6.
re
Communist objectives for world domination* of their plana to create
chaos and disorder, and of their attacks against weak spots, aspeoially
against rising new and unoosmeltted nations. The deployed fleets of
the '*asrj
,
together with tiieir esaborked and ready Sarine landing forces,
are the nation's most evident and affeotivo response."
The iiavy has also demanded the funds to get into the game of
providing forces for both general and limited war» Wot the Army, the
Navy realises that the stakes in the game ore high. They include the
costly attack carrier striking forces, sea lift forces, the submarine
fleet, the Solaris and other missiles, and the maintenance of the Marine .
Corps, Of these programs the carriers, sea lift, and Marines have added
implications for limited war. *hs i-iavy thinks of the attack carrier
striking force as a means of fighting nuclear war (as part of the nuclear
detorrent with the Strategic Air ^omaand of the Mr force) and of
fighting local war with nuclear or conventional weapons. For 1baited
wars the light attach aircraft carrier, the old £sses class, would be
used. According to Vice Admiral Davis, "the light attack aircraft
carriers are equipped to carry all our air-to-surface weapons except
the larger nuclear weapons. The burden of close air support, interdiction,
and other Halted war missions will be carried cut largely by (their)
aircraft, 1,21 The carrier striking force has also been pushed by Arairal
Burke, who sees it as '"the logical ready- military force to counter
the threats of Halted war in many areas of the world."
c But he has
Thomas Gates, "Limited won where do they stand?", Amy, ^uvy. Air
Force Begister and defense TLaes , vol. 80, Boy 25, 1969, pp. 34-T5.
21
Vice Admiral Davis, oo. olt« , p, 804.
22
Army. ::avy, -ir I-oroe Journal, vol. ICVI, January 31, 1969, p. »•
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also MainWtedtrie need for modernizing these fcross. 3| stated that nost
of these carriers *ould be obsolete by 1966 and new o&rriars sould bo
needed, since %*wo will eontinuo to need carriers in the future for
Halted war just as has boon ropoata&ly demonstrated in the past fm
years , and the need will b-3 urgent
,
just as it has in the past*"
An integral part of the Savy ' s forces to combat liiaited war is the
Sarin© Corps. The isarine Corps has of course, supported the need for the
attack oarrier strike force, since the Serines are the ground forces to
be deployed in liiaited war situations. General Pate, Marine Corps Chief
of Stuff, has supported this force; he sees amphibious foroes as the
beet means to meet the limited war threat, i*e wants the country to
plaoe its main reliance upon "a&ritine" strongth to meet liaited war
situations. This would involve using, the S3a as a base, relying on landing
forces where the Wftj their logistic substance, and their fire support
are all packaged and ready in ships, and are lau-ohed upon our enemy from
JM
the ocean, in the strength and form demanded by -.he specific situation.
The advantages of this type of force would be that it would not require
costly oversees -bases, it can lose itself in the ocean and remain un-
undeteoted and unoomaitted, and it could move silently and secretly to
trouble spots. 26 Brigadier General ttichard Lmngrua (Marine Corps Chief
of operations and Plans) has also stated that the helioopterborne
ilarine
landing teams armed with four kinds of miesilee and backed by Marine
2*lb id *
^General Kandolph JtoC Pate. "How can we cope with limited
Arsy. Kary. Air Force Regl^r and Defense
Times, vol. 30, November 28, 1959,
p. itl
£5 Ibid.
jet fighters have given the Marine Corps a f,new capability" to meet
limited war threats. 26
Thus the #avy and Marine Corps have joined the debate on the side
of those who favor preparing an adequate capability to meet the threat
of limited war, Suoh a capability would give the Navy more oarriers
V
and troop transports, more aircraft, more missiles. It would give the
Marines greater personnel strength, better weapons, and more aircraft.
For both it means a greater budget and more prestige and power. Hence,
for both services it is the obvious side to take.
26
Brigadier General Richard Mangrum, Army, Navy, Air Force Register ?
vol. 79, January 11, 1958, pp. 3 & 22 0
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To the United States Air Foroe the most formidable throat to
Aaarlean security is posed by the intercontinental nuclear wis s ilea
and manned aircraft of the Soviet Union. Thus African lon?r-range air
power, the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union completely, is the best
deterrent and the best means of preventing Russian aggression anywhere.
As General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, has expressed it,
*the Soviets have been constrained mm not by the US battalions and shijs
and tactical aircraft that we deployed — but oonstrained to the great
decree by the established capacity of Ameriaan long-range air power,
lie has also stated that "the United States must be capable of destroying
the military power of the enemy. This capability is the foundation of
our deterrent posture. This is the only thing that will deter the Soviets
from taking aggressive action against our allies and from launohing a
devastating nuolear attack against the United States."28 In his view-
point ; rategic Air Command is the "primary deterrent force,"
followed by the air defense forces as the next important element in the
strategic concept. The least important element, in his opinion, is the
tactioal air force. The Air Poros has a great stales in maintaining a
policy of combating the genaral war threat. It involves manpov/er,
bombers, missiles, and funds. Thus, to the -^ir rorce the polioy of
exclusive aassiv© retailiation is still valid, and the first priority Is
to deter the Soviets from launching a surprise nuolear attaok on the
United States. Budgetary considerations thus place limited war forces in
a lower priority.
^Goneral Thorns white, testimony before Senate Araed Services Committee
Mtw York Times , January 28, 195S, ?. 1.
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Furthermore, the Air Force feels that there is no need to prepare
separate foroes to fight limited mrs* Aooording to Secretary of the
Air Force James Douglas, "the fundamental Air Foroe task is to maintain
in-being forces of tho slae and effectiveness to deter general war. In
these forces laaintained to meet general war requirements, there is a
powerful and effective capability, adaptable aa appropriate, to meet
29
such limited war situations as may oocur." This is the old point of
view formulated by Charles .Vilson in 1954. Thus the Air Force attitude
toward limited war did not change frota 1964 to 1959. It was also the
point of view of General Kathan Twining ^hen he was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. His attitude was that between the extremes of
total nuclear war and "subversive political activity" there were a large
number of military und "quasi-military* choices open to the Communists.
One of these choices could be limited war. Es emphasised that this threat
had to bo recognizee- but in his opinion, the United States capabilities
for local or limited war derive in large part from these required to
deter or firht a general war. The type of air and sea forces required
to oontrol the air and sea lines of communication in general war, in
largo 3oale aggressions in the Far E.,st, in Southeast r.sia, or in the
•cid-o st, are also necessary for effectual reaction to smaller scale
aggression."50 The same thing has been Bald by General White, tho Air
Force Chief of Staff, who has stated that an "essential aspect of our
total g .--neral war force is its inherent limited war capability. The
Air toroe has, within its resources, . designed its structure to provide
^James Douglas, "Limited wan where do they stand? " Army. Havy, Air
Foro© Register and lefense Ti&ae , vol. 80, Hay 23, 1359, p. 25.
m&rw* B&Ty* Mr Eof Journal, vol, XCVI, January 3:, 1969, p. 31.
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the desired general war strength plus a capacity to fight successfully
in limited war." 31
Although the attitude that limited war is possible exists in Air
Force circles, there seems to be a divergence of opinion as to the use
of air power. There are two schools of thought on this subject in Air
Force circles as reported by Colonel I* H. Hampton, Deputy for Evaluation,
Air War College* In his view one school believes rthat in limited war
situations air power can establish conditions that would either be deoisive
in themselves and thus preclude the need for surface operations or that
would establish conditions so favorable as to make successful exploitation
of results by surface forces a foregone conclusions* The other school
seems to believe "that in limited weir the role of air power forces,
specifically the Air Force, should be one of primarily supporting surface
33
aotions and exploiting surface operations." The actual Air Force view
seems to be a combination of both of these schools of thought with the
former having somewhat more influence on Air Force policy.
For the purpose of dealing with limited wars the Air Foroe has
created a Tactical Air Command. The Command contains aircraft necessary
to perform the variety of air tasks needed in limited war operations*
According to General 0. P. Weyland, former oommander of TAG, the purpose
behind TAG was to tailor an air foroe to meet any limited war threat and
eliminate this threat through the use of air power. He stated: "We
believe timeliness and quick reaotion are of the utmost importance.
31
Army, Mavy, Air Force Journal , vol. XCVI, November 1, 1958, p. 3
32Colonel §< H. Hampton, "Unlimited confusion over limited war",
Air University Quarterly Ueview , vol. IX, Spring, 1967, pp. 44-45.
S5
Ibid.
Generally speaking, the average small, friendly oountry whloh is a
possible target for local aggression has a capability for effective
ground fighting, but few have an appreciable taotioal air capability.
If they know they will bo supported quiokly, they may be depended upon
to fight in defense of their country."34 This point of view is similar
to the school of thought advooating the use of air power in limited war
chiefly to support ground forces. The opposite opinion has been voiced
by General <7hite who believes that as the Army develops its atomic
weaponry, it reduces the close air support functions of the Taotlcal
Air Foroe, thus leaving it the role of conducting deoisive limited air
35
war campaigns*
Beoause the Air Force believes that the Communists will concentrate
in areas where the United States has no deployed forces, a program known
as the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) Concept was devised whereby
the 19th Air Force v/as established to conduct "on a continuing basis
timely studies of all areas of the world in which possible limited
conflict might be forced upon members of the Free World** According
to Major General Henry Viccellio, commander of the 19th Air Foroe, the
idea of the Composite Air Strike Force was bora beoause "the United
States oould not afford to station forces in being on a permanent peace-
time basis in every locale, sufficient for any eventuality. But a small,
54
General 0. P. Weyland, "Taotioal Air Power*, Ordnance vol,, 42,
March-April, 1958, p, 801 •
"
55
Army, Kavy, Air Force Journal vol, XCIV, August 10, 1967, p. 3.
36 General 0. P. Wayland, "Composite Air Strike Foroe", Amy, Navy, Air
Force Journal vol, XCV, December 7, 1959, p. 8#
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lethal force, only hours away from any area in the world would be a
deterrent, limited only by the effectiveness of the foroe and the time
required to move it to a troubled area,"37 In his opinion the Air force
was fitted for this task because of the speed and range, low cost, and
destruotivenees of just one air squadron. Such a force would permit
leaving deployed forces where they were and still prevent the emergence
of "holes" in the defense system* Such a foroe would also leave the
massive retaliation potential of SAC undisturbed.
As previously mentioned, this task was given to the 19th Air Force
under General Henry Vicoellio. This Air Force commands no units except
during 4otual iombat deployment and operations • It trains and coinnands,
identifies landing fields to be used and areas of possible deployment,
and names the specific TAG units to be used in the operation. Thus the
Composite Air Strike Il orce provides conventional or nuclear forces which
can be dispatched to any area of the world, to be used alone or as part
of a joint operation, in a limited war or to replace theater forces
sent to other areas of the world thus preventing a gap in the defense
38
uotture. The foroes used in these operations would come from the 9th
and 12th ^acticul Air Forces and would consist chiefly of F-100 fighter
bombers, iaoe and ^tador surfaoti-to-surface missiles, transport and
support aircraft* In the area of conflict these forces could conduct
3?
General Henry Vicoellio, "Composite Air Strike Foroe", Air University
Quarterly Review , vol, IX, Winter 1956-57, p. 28.
38
Ibid# , pp. 34-35.
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oountsr air operations, Interdiction, close uir support, tactical rooonalssance,
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and airlift. In 1958 Composite :dr Strike Forces were sent to Lebanon and
Formosa, and it was claimed by the Air Force that these forces "helped
Uaaasurably to halt these flare-ups before .forld-wide nuolear exchange
became a possible results"40
At least ajaomz the commanders of 17 C the proposition that the possi-
bility of Halted wars occurring in the future began to take hold. In
1S69 General Vioeellio* oaamander of the 19th Air Foroe, expressed this
view* He noted* "Perhaps toore than anything ulse, we in TAC are anxious
to establish the proper emphasis on limited vmr versus general war.
v'.hile cur equipment and our missions are compatible with either cir-
cumstance, the aooeptanoe of both possibilities we believe will lead to
Al
a full appreciation of our military and political environment. " Thie
attitude has also been supported by General Frank Everest, the present
oomounder of TAC, who stated that "only If we fail to maintain modern
taotical weapons systoas will ¥e jeopardise our ability to meet the
11 war threat."42
'^-'Composite air Strike i'oroe. ' Army, flawy, ir I oroe Journal , vol. XCV,
July 19,1953. p. 23.
^General Henry Viooellic, "Composite ~ir Strike Force 1356,"
Air University quarterly Hoview, vol. X, duimaer, 1959, p. 14.
41
Ibid,, p. 17
»
42
Goneral Frank Lverest, TAC today, " The Almen , vol, IV,January.
I960, p. 3.
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While this is the attitude of TAG, the rest of the Air Force pay
only lip servioe to the forces of the T^otioal Air Command. It has
been supported by General LeMay who has fought for the maintenance
of manned bomber and fighter strength. 43 General Yv'hite has stated that
the composite strike forces "represent a long stride in the direction
of fast response to limited war situations, and he has supported TAG
on several occasions Nevertheless, .as far as fund allocation within
the servioe is concerned, TAG has been the stepchild of the Air Force.
43
Army, flavy, Air Force Journal , vol. XCVI, September 6, 1958, p. 14.
44
Army, Navy, Air frorce Journal , vol. XCVI, November 1, 1958, p. 31.
45
See General White's comments in the Army, Havy, Air Foroe Journal
vol. XCVI, January 31, 1959, p. 35; The Airman vol. Ill, July, 1959, p. 46:
and the Army, i^avy, Air Force Register , vol. LXjCa, liovember 28, 1959, p. 17.
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The Armed Services have developed a melange of programs to deal with
limited war and have a variety of attitudes toward the priority of develop-
ment of these programs. In the words of Representative George iahon
(D ## Tex.), chairman of the defense subcommittee of the House Appropria-
tions Committee i
It would appear that under present circumstances each
of the three services is seeking to be prepared to do the
entire job — fight the whole war. This, of course, is
not the announced policy of each service... The Army wants
a strategic-type missile so it can attack distant targets
and will not be dependent upon the Air Force even for re-
oonaissanoe. The Navy wants a strong air and missile
capacity to take care of its own strategic needs and
concepts. The Air Force may well want to keep its
strategic aircraft mission even after missiles have
replaoed the strategic mission of manned aircraft. The
real battle at present results... from the anxiety which
arises over the question of who will dominate the picture
in the missile atomic age. .However, ... .the time has
come to tear down the costly iron curtain which separates
the services.
^
There is much truth in this statement, although it would be denied by
the services. It points to the fact that there is a great political
struggle going on among the services in order to maintain their respective
budgets and positions.
One of these struggles has been over the need for airlift by the
Army to transport its forces quickly to trouble spots in the world.
The Army claims it does not have the facilities to move one division by
air (this does not apply to the airborne divisions). This opinion has
been voiced by Generals (ret.) Gavin and Taylor and by General Lemnitzer,
the present Cliaiman of the Joint Chiefs of Stuff. According to
46
Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt. 6, 85th Congress, 1st Session,
May 24, 1957, pi 7605.
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General (ret.) Thomas Phillips, the Air Force T*has refused to give any
priority to furnishing sufficient air transport to carry one or two
Army or Marine divisions quickly to the scene of conflict. 1 Air Foroe
officials say that "it (the Air Force) cannot sacrifice the need to
build up the Strategic Air Coccmnd and air defenses to provide airlift
for the Array. t47 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liathan Twining
has implied that it is all a matter of priorities, he stated in 1958
that when the Joint Chiefs were considering what they would like to buy
the most if they were given an additional £1.5 or 52.5 billion, "troop
carrier aircraft were not on any service list. In this sense he
blamed the services, including the Amy* for not pushing increased air-
lift, furthermore, he has stated that, in faot, the United States
already has sufficient troop airlift, as was shown in the Lebanon incident.
In that case, he stated, the United States had more airlift than was
needed, for the airfields were not in sufficient quantity to take care
of a large airlift. He has even questioned the value of a large-scale
airlift by stating, "I do not know of any place except on the mainland
of Europe itself where you could really launch a massivs airlift of the
«49
kind that General Gavin was talking about, two or three divisions.
Yet the Army wants more airlift. This desire does not stem, however,
from purely strategic motivation. It would allow the Army to gain extra
power without expending any of the Anay's budget, as the funds would come
47Army, Savy, Air loroe Register , vol. LXXYIII, July 6, 1957, ?. 2.
48Congressional Record , vol. 104, pt. 15, 65th Congress, 2nd Session,
Au gu st 21, 1958, p. 18388.
49
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from the Air Force Budget. Furthermore, there ia the specter of the
aircraft industry behind this struggle. An in oretted airlift *ould bring
bigger contracts to this industry, and thus they advocate more airlift
along with an increase in manned aircraft for the services. This attitude
has been verified by Robert Gross , ohaixmn of the board of Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. In December of 1957 and by I r. Mall Hibbaro, a. vice presl-
SOdent of Lockheed, in early 1968. While such a program may be beneficial
to the country, there is tha danger that it may actually do more harm
than .^ood. This applies to mere airlift as well as to newer missiles
and "exotic 11 weapons* According to Representative William Bray (R., Ind.)j
it is interesting that there is always u loudly vocal
group which demands that one speeific segment of our military
be expanded to the exclusion of the others to the detriment
of the entire military program. It is also interesting that
this demand for a specific weapon is usually ma4a after the
'specific weapon 1 they are selling Is outmoded* 01
If this is true, then some of the programs which will help build up a
limited war force may have fallen by the wayside for selfish, not
strategic reasons.
Cne of the reasons why such procrams (such as am modernisation
an* troso airlift; <«a?o lost out is internal. The fany, in a drive to
sot up a fissile program in the raid-lSoC's, olea its budget, thus pre-
venting & modernisation of woapons.*^ However, evoa aftor muoh of the
Army 's mlestle program was taken awuy from it, the Any continued to
press for tho a**ilQt**mz& of the anti-missile and air defense as a way
SOsee Sew York Hatet , December 11, 1637 and Ordnance vol. 42# I*ar*h~
*pril # 1953, pp. 614-lfl.
&X
oon^re8sloaal H>5, pt. 1?, 66th *mi+**i lst i^ssion,
SepteSBer 1, 19 oC , p. 17817
.
&2
Tlm»# vol. LXXVI, October 17, 1900, p. 26.
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of staying in the race for missile control, at the expense of a
modernization program. The Air Force has also tied up funds in programs
in order to save them, when in some oases were scheduled to be dis-
continued or were not yet ready to roll. Such *.ms the case in 1956,
when it stepped up production of the B-62 at a time when the country
was well ahead of the Russians in manned bombers. The same could be
said of the liquid boron fuel project on which 1 240 million was lavished
before it was discontinued.55 The same can be said of the iiatador, Snark,
Navaho, and Rasoal missiles. The Kavy w&s also guilty of such maneuvering.
The ^avy's Seamaster bomber was discontinued after 3400 million v/as
spent on it. The Regulus air-breathing missile was obsolete before it
was developed, and it too was discontinued.^
Another reason programs for limited war have been neglectod is
because of the fight for missile control among the three services. The
Air Force has (as of .I960) three ICBMf s in operation or being developed
and seven other assorted surface-to-surface, air-to-air, surface-to-air,
and air-to-surface missiles operational or in the development stages.
The Army has fourteen assorted missiles in operation or being developed,
55
and the #avy lias twelve including fr^o under^ater-to-underwater missiles.
The great cost of these missiles naturally takes up a great portion of
the budgets of the services. Greater coordination of these programs could,
conceivably, free more funds for limited war programs.
^Congressional Record, vol. 105, pt. 14, 86th Congress, 1st Session,
Se ptember 1, 1959, p. 17^20
.
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0rdnanoe , vol. 44, March-April, 1960, inset. This is un increase of
seventeen over the missiles produced or bein# developed in 1956.
There is also the problem of waste in the cervices, due to excessive
duplication of facilities and services. The duplication in the missile
field was just noted. Others include the existence of marginal and
non-essential installations and activities based on outmoded mobilization
plans geared for World War II, three different types of supply systems,
separate maintenance of communication networks, separate intelligence
services, and separate jet trainers used by the Navy and Air Force. 56
These are just a few of many instances of duplication. If this dupli-
cation were oorreoted, the Republicans argue, the country could ret a
greater or the same degree of defense for a lesser sum of money. However,
there are still the obstacles offered by the services themselves in
seeking to maintain their own positions.
Thus, the reasons for the attitudes of the armed services toward
limited war are as varied as the attitudes themselves. At least all the
services see the need for the development of forces to cope -with limited
war situations. But there is a great deal of difference between mere
words and actual deeds.
Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt. 12, 66th Congress, 1st Session,
August 10, 1959, p. 153S0.
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Chapter III
The Debute on Limited War
The Administration
Early in 1S57 ^resident Eisenhower appointed H. Rowan Neither,
Chairman of the Board of the Ford Foundation, as chairman of a secret
committee to investigate the status of American security* Although
originally secret, section* of the report were finally published late
in the year. The report stressed the fact that the United States would
be moving; into a period of military weakness unless spending for military
and civil defsnse were increased. It is not <nown whether the recommenda-
tions of the ooauiittee were adopted* They were not even presented to
the Senate Araed Services Committee. Gome of the reasons given for this
action were expressed by Senator Stuart Symington who felt that the
administration believed the report to be so "terrifying** in its implica-
tions with respect to the current position of the united States, that
even Senators were not allowed to look at it.* It 3howed too muoh
dissatisfaction with administration policies and placed them in a bad
li&ht. Release of these recommendations in full would be bad publicity
and might even have put a scare into our allies. Thus the administration
was able to keep the report under the cloak of secrecy, and refused to
say what effect thess recommendations would have on policy*
Yet, President Eisenhower did use tho report as a background in his
speeoh of *ovaaber 14, 1957, at Oklahoma ^ity. There he stated,
"..as a primary deterrent to war, the nation must maintain a strong
Congressional necord vol, 104, pt. 14, 85th Jon-ress, 2nd Session,
August 14, 1958, p. 17b£3
.
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nuolear retaliatory power and weapons must keep paoe with increasing
technological projects. The dispersal and readiness of the Strategio
Air Command must be increased so that it will not be destroyed on the
ground by missile attack.,. In cooperation with its /Qlies, the United
States must maintain a flexible force with conventional weapons to put
out brush-fire wars before they can spread into all-out nuclear war." 2
With this speech, the Army began to take heart, believing that the
administration was at last ready to heed its advice and recognize the
need to have ioroes capable of meeting all types of aggression. Indeed,
it seemed as if this were going to occur, for in May of 1953, the admin-
istration announced the formation of the Strategio Army Corps to deal with
limited war situations anywhere in the world. It was to be made up of
150,000 infantrymen and paratroopers — two infantry and two airborne
divisions maintained in the United States to meet or reinforce any
initial requirements throughout the world. Its effectiveness and speed
were dependent upon adequate air and sea lift to be supplied by the Air
i1 oroe and Navy.' Although it seemed impressive, STRuC was a paper
organization. It contained many green troops and had a high turnover,
and not enough air lift was being supplied by the Air Force to transport
one division overseas.* However, it was a beginning.
There are two possible explanations for the creation of STRAC. It
could have been merely a "sop" thrown to the critics of the administration
to quiet them for the time being) or it could have been part of a genuine
^President Eisenhower, quoted in Mew York Times , December 21, 1957, p. 8.
3New ^ork Times
,
May 21, 1958, p. 10.
4
Hanson Baldwin, Kew York Times, May 24, 1958, p. 12.
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effort by the administration to oeaac relying upon tho doctrine of
massive retaliation to solve all of ita defense problems, to begin to
see the possibility of limited wars occurring in tho future, and to
implement policy to provide the forces to meet this throat. If this
seoond reason is taken as valid, certain policy decisions and statements
by the administration seem to bear it out. first there was a study
ordered by the National Security Council in May of 1958 to examine in
detail a score of areas in the world to determine the sise and composition
of forces required to meet local egrrssslon. Taking part in the study-
were both State Department and Pentagon officials. Its purpose was to
draw up a picture of the world situation in order to determine a basis
for a Halted war policy to be followed by the administration. 5 This
was coupled with an announcement by tho Soorotary of Defense 2j'eil •'•or.lroy
at a news conference that month that he planned to publicise American
capabilities of masting limited war situations. Ri indicated that
information on such a capability had been neglected because of the
hi. h priority placed on strategic weapons, but that the administration
was not negleoting it and that this capability was, in fact, adequate to
meet any emergenoy. However, he did indicate that only by retaining an
ability to retaliate with great destructive power available through the
Stratcgie Air Command would general mr be less lively than limited war.
These atatementa thus supported the Air Jroroa point of view with regard
to priorities of weapone systems 7 and indioated that, although the
*Hn York limes , fey 25, 1953, p. 28,
6I4eil iio&lroy, quoted In law York Times , Hay 50, 1958, p. 1.
7
A weapons system is defined as those "facilities and equipment, in
combination or otherwise, whioh form an instrument of combat to be used
by one or more of the military departmental Army, Navy, Air *droe
Journal, vol, IffUg Juno 27, 1959, pp. 1, 53.
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administration was thinking about the possibilities of limited wars, the
main concern was developing a huge nuolcar retaliatory force at the expense
of conventional forces.
Nevertheless, by June of 1952 it seemed as if the Army position
sight be gaining. Due to Aray prodding and the rush of '"small ws"
sinae 1345 (see page 25a ) f it seemed that the administration had begun
to take notice of the possibility of developing a separate limited war
•apability. Two major studios on limited war had bean started, a third
study on troop carrier airlift was also started, and an Army force
(STRAC) had been created to deal with any siaall-soale emergency that
might occur.
Secretary ^o&lroy even indicated at a press conference that in the
future the Defense Department would make a "greater effort" to stress
8
the country's capacity to cope wit:, United wars.
This hope was short-lived, however. Late that same month at
aj.other press conference Secretary c -Iroy outlined the chief problems
facing the Defense Department — military spending, choosing araon.
weapons eyste~is, judging the forces required for so-called limited war,
continental defenses, ^Jd strategic forces for nuclear retaliation. If
stressed that there was unanimity in governmental departments that the
fundamental deterrent to a war with the Soviet -nion was the country's
nuclear retaliatory for«s, and that existing Army and Marine troops
equipped with superior weapons were adequate to cope with limited war
situations. Shat came ac a bitter blow to the Army ms the statement
that the nation's future military security lay in priorities for big
New York Times, June 2, 1356, p. 14.
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weapons j he even stressed the use of 3-47*3 equipped with conventional
weapons as useful for limited warfare.9
The Army position was further downgraded by i-onald stuarles. Deputy
Secretary of Defanse, in a speech at the Marine Corps School in July
of 1953. There he put forth a plan to deal with limited wars merely
by strengthening the forces of our allies to deter the ^ ojjj.huniBts from
starting liraited wars,*0 This would then free American efforts to
build up retaliatory' forces. At the saae time he stated, *>7e must have
f laxibilit--' to meet any situation, but our overriciag ob
t
1ectivos must
be readiness for this worso eventuality (all-out war), in case our
efforts to hold it to small war proportions fail."11
Thus, throughout the period 1057-19S8 the administration's attitude
toward limited war was not vory clear. At times Secretary -c.Jlroy
indicated that more effort would bo made to improve the country's ability
to oope with limited wars. It did not seem that these indications vrere
sincere, or would be adhered to, for it was evident that the Defense
Department as well as the President viewed the troops in-being as sufficient
to cope with limited war, and that top priority Tsould still be given the
large nuclear weapons, fthat is evident here is that words, reports,
and studies ^re cheap an • can be used to quiet oritios who may embarrass
the adainlstration. One of these critics was Senator Stuart Symington.
In -August of 1SS8 he indicated the uselessness of the policy of the
administration of calling in special oonr.ittees and starting special
Neil ^o-'lroy, press conference, Sew ^n: limes , June 20, 1956, p. 11.
1Qaew York limes , July 7, 1968, p. 13.
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studies *hich would indicate that aotion had been taken by the administra-
tion to meet now threats to Aaerioan security. BU spoeoh ran as follows:
*
tim and again in recent years the administration has
gotten together an Independent group of patriotic citizens
to make various reports about the status of our national
defense* *.
When the -ockefoller report issued, what did it say?
It said, in effect, *Y?e are not doing nearly enough to
defend the United States** What has the result been since
that report or rather sinoe sputniok? We have added 1 #3
peroent to what we wore already spending to defend ourselves,
which is a great deal loss than the administration figures
with respect to the devaluation of the dollar over the
same period,
Xhen we had the Oaither re port*.The report was never
released, even to the Senate Armed Services Coxaaittee*
it wus refused the Senate Armed Services Ccsa&ittee and
the rumor spread that the report was so terrifying in
its implications with respect to the current position
of the ^ited States in the world of today that evfcn
Senators were not allowed to look at it* Actually, it
has never yet been given to the Armed Services ^OHuaittee*
fee come now even to another report, one discovered by
the counsel of the Johnson Preparedness Subcommittee, who
read about it in the h&lt'Maore ^un, (This refers to the
Johns *iopkin« study headed by Tr. Illis Johnson*)
It said in effect, f This is your (the administration) fault*
You people in the administration continue to get groups of
outstanding oitiseas together to make reports. Without
exception, they all say that what wo are doing is totally
inadequate* •Tliey all say we could spend billions of dollars
aore a year on defense without adversley affecting the
eeonoray ***In other words, ever; tiaie you set up a conualttes,
that eorxnittee suys we are not doing enough* Yet we do very
little more. f 12
Although this was a highly partisan speech, it did shew that the
administration ^as not fooling everyone*
-on; r-srlo'v-I -oorv, vol. 104, pt* 14, 55t:^Cogress, 2nd Session,
st K, l$L . $ pp. 17 5is-24
•
It eould also be said that the statements of Secretary tfoElroy were
aloo being used merely as a means of temporarily quieting the oritios
of the administration, while the debate ocnoorning the new budget was
in progress. Vrertheloes, it must be admitted that at least the
administration finally admitted publicly that a study of the country's
United war capability was needed, and that, if the r.ots warranted it,
such a capability would reooive further attention. It was apparently
not of immediate concern, however.
Thus, in his State of the Union messa e in January of If* 58,
^resident Eisenhower stressed the "formidable air striking forces " of
the united States and the great flexibility of this force, H© oven
painted a rosy pioture of swift-moving, powerful "ground and tactical*
forces moving with "swiftness and precision" to "help cut off threatened
aggression, * 5 The tone of the speooh was unmista'ceably favorable to
tho strengthening of the nuclear retaliatory forces, and any mention
of the capability to fight limited wars was vague and lightly passed
over* This trend was followed in testimony by General T .fining and
Secretary ^oklroy before the Senate Foreign Relations ^oantibtea and Armed
Services "Jom-iitteo, Before the foreign Relations Ooruaittee Secretary
MoElroy indicated that the united States' military power was still adequate
to deter the Russians from starting a general war, and that for looul
warfare tho United States had enough conventional firepower to contain
14
the hostilities and prevent them frcm spreading,* Likewise, a glowing
report was given to the Armed Services Committee, There Mo&lroy voiced
^President Eisenhower, State of the Union iiessage, quoted in sow York
limes
,
January 10, 1959, p. 6.
14Hew York Times, January 17, 1S69. p. Is
the old Charles Him lino that the United States 1 ability to deal with
liaitod war situations was derived from its forces i'or waging general
15
war. However, it is dlffioult to see how the Jcint Chiefs and the
Secretary of Defease oould bo anything but optimistic concerning defense
policies; essentially the policies were thoir own and thus had to be
defended.
to the administration at thut tisie the overall United States military
posture ssemed good, la all fields of weaponry the United States seemed
to be ahead or equal with the Russians. Russia had 150 heavy bombers
compared to the United States' 500-600) 1000 medium bombers to the
U.S.'s 1600 1 hundreds of 700-800 mile missiles compared to 4 U.S. Xhor
(1500 mi,) squadrons in Great Britain) the two were eve a ir. * S)
Russia had no fleet carriers to the G.S.'s 14) 450 submarines (none
missile-firing or nuclear) to the r.S.»s 53 nuclear submarines and -50
16
ocnventional submarines) 175 divisions to the R***H 17. This added
up to a nuclear superiority for the United States, but indicated a lack
in limited war forces, as nuelear weapons oould not ^e viewed as sub-
stitutes for a limited war capability, furthermore, these published
figures on Russian strength were at best uesstimatee" and way behind
ourrent intelligence. Thus, while the administration had confidence in
its policies, it was hard to tell where the United States stood in
relation to the Soviet Union and just how effective our forces were.
According to the Army and &avy, we were behind.
Hew *ork Times, January 21, 1559, p. 11
Hanson Baldwin, few York Times, April 5, 1953, IV, p. 3.
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Although the United States seemingly had this "nuclear superiority,
"
it was evident that the Defense Department was facing serious problems.
Tha Army and Navy ware ranped against the Air i*'orae with regard to the
strength of the deterrent for general war, the Amy and the Wavy still
maintaining that an overkill capacity existed and that more funds should
be allocated for limited war forces j while the Air Foroe maintained that
we raust have sufficient forces to "destroy the enemy's ability to destroy
us/1 There was also the Army view that more manpower and funds were
neadad to develop a capability for waging limited war6, with or without
nuclear waapons. These were the major problems of importance to this
1 7paper, although there were others.*'
Up to his retirement on December 2, 1959, and in spite of those
problems. Secretary iioElroy reiterated his belief that the United States
had a sufficient capability to deal with limited war as well as general
war, even though the Army and **avy were saying that this was not so.
«ith the appointment of Thomas Gates as Secretary of Defense in December
of 1959, a new variable entered the picture, for Mr. Gates as Secretary
of the Navy had been a strong supporter of outbacks in expenditures for
increased nucleur deterrent in order to develop limifcad war forces.
What his attitude as Secretary of Defense is going to be will be interesting
to note.
Thus from 1957 to 1959 the administration, although at tines forceful
in maintaining the superiority of the American military structure, 6eemed
hesitant about stating what its position in regard to limited war actually
For other problems facing the rentagon ano Defense Department, see
the New York Times, May 4 # 1969, p. 25 and riay 5, 1959, p. 20.
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was. At no time oid it define its policies toward limited war. Time
and again the Secretary of Defease, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and tne President indicated that the country possessed adequate forces
to meet all situations, while at the same time, they ordered studies to
determine whether these capabilities were in faot adequate. Then, when
these studies and reports indicated that more had to be done, the Adminis-
tration refused to aot. Although the Army, the liavy, and other administra-
tion personnel reiterated the need for a change in emphasis in defense
policy, the administration regained committed to the oonoept of massive
retaliation as a panacea for all military problems. There was no change
in priorities during this period, and the attitude remained the same as
it was in 1954.
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Chapter IV
The Debate on Limited v^ar
Congress
The debate over the country's defense posture has increased in
sharpeess in the halls of Congress from 1957 to 1959* During this period
it has also become more partisan in character. In the debate limited
war has taken an important role. The debate is essentially over whether
the country is spending enough to insure adequate defense* The Democrats
have argued that we are extending our commitments without providing
adequate forces to meet them and that we are relying too heavily on
massive retaliation to solve all our military problems. The Democrats
have also felt that the administration has made too much of an effort to
economize at the expense national security. The Republican minority,
on the other hand, has continually backed administration policy and has
felt that the backbone of a strong defense is a strong economy . They
have refused to agree to increasing the defense budget to the sums asked
for by the Democrats but have reluctantly had to go along with the majority.
On the whole, especially in the Senate, they have tended to view forces
required for massive retaliation as sufficient to deter the Communists
from starting any local wars. This chapter will try to cover the course
of this debate, with particular emphasis on limited war, from 1957 to 1959.
The first session of the 85th Congress during 1957 was marked by a
particular lack of conflict over the defense issue, especially with
regard to limited war forces. ?he Democrats tended to show partisanship
in their speeches on national defense, but they were not as sharp as
those in 1958, or 1959. The main reason for this lack of sharpness and
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interest in the debate was that there was not a clear enough Democratic
majority in the Senate (43 Democrats and 47 Republicans) to permit the
Senate to aot with bold authority to counter administration policy,
^either party could rally their forces in the liouse. 'ru"theraore,
there were no pressing international incidents (such as Lebanon
and rormosa in 1958) to bring about sharp oonflists in Congress. Also,
the first sputnik was launohed too late in the year to have any effect
on this session, i-inally, it seemed as if the drastic need for more
limited war forces had not taken hold in either party in 1957.
In the House in 1357 both Democrats and Republicans voiced the same
opinion with regard to national defense and limited war, Xhey both
voiced the need for economy and forces adequate to meet all military
threats. The democratic position was clarified by Rep. ;£obert Sikcs
(D., i' la.) urho said that "if limited wars are to be the pattern or if
Russia suddenly moves to occupy all of Europe, we must have trained and
equipped troops on the ground and ready, Several Republicans epoke for
their side and all agreed that a sound economy #as necessary if the country
was to oontinue to enjoy prosperity. But in the words of Rep. Joseph
*"artin (R#l lMM»)« 'the poorest place in the world to begin that eoonoay
is risking our national security." 2 Likewise, Rep* Leslie Areads
(R., 111.) stated that 'we are not willing %o commit tha sin of risking
the safety of our country in the name of economy. In a 3peech in
June of 1957 Rep. James V^n iandt (R., ^a.) else voiced the need for the
Congressional record. Vol. 10S, pt. 5, 35th Congress, 1st 6-ssion,
aay £7, 1957, p. 7723.
2
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maintenance of | sound massive retaliatory capacity as well as a
"capaoity to fight snail or limited wars with the use of either tactical
atonic weapons or of conventional arms, as the oircumstanoes may require, "*
During this session in the House these statements were scattered and for
the most part, brief. There were no major speeches on defense in the
House during 1957, and the speeches that were made usually agreed with
eaoh other.
The same tended to be true in the Senate in 1357. There was no
apparent debate over the country's defense posture, and what disagree-
ment that did show up occurred within the ranks of the Demooratic party.
To Senator Dennis Chaves (D», H.iJ.), the chairman of the defease sub-
committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the possibility that
the United States might have to face limited wars in the future was
f-reat, but the existing deterrent forces were adequate to prevent these
wars from oreaking out into general war.** The chief opposition to this
attitude oame from Senator Paul Douglas (D., 111.) in a major speech on
defense polioy. He statod that we had increased our commitments but
had reduced the "military strength which we need to help check probing
it
operations and liaited wars started by the Communist bloc"0 He cited
the existence of the nuclear stalemate, and said that what was needed to
prevent the outbreak of liaited wars under the umbrella of this stalemate
was "a sufficient force in readiness, v/ell-equipped and trained, which
can be rushei to cruolal points which the Communists are either attaokiag
4Ibid
., pt. 5, July 1, 1957, ?. 10264.
5 lb Id.
, p. 106 19.
6 Ibid., p. 10654.
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or threatening to attaok.*' 7 Tot, he felt that this was the portion of
our araed services that was being slighted by the etnphasis being placed
on the "major- deterrents." The same sentient was echoed by Senators
Stuart Symington (^., Joseph 0»Hahoney U., .\y0
. , 'ike *%nsfield
Jlont.), and Henry Jaokson (l>., ash.).8
Conspicuously, during this whole session there vrere no speeches by
the Republicans on this matter, nor
-/ere the efforts of the Democrats
overly strong. On the whole, in both the house and the Senate, 1957
i'/us a relatively quiet year in tho urea of national defense and limited
war. Ihus, there were no real, stronr attitudes on either side, nor
were there any clear cut issues to divide the two sides on partisan ground.
In contrast to 1957, the second session of the 86th degress in
1953 w^s the dlroot opposite. The dobate over defense, and especially
United war, became more heated and tho parties began to take opposite
sides, the Republicans defending existing force levels and the use of
nassivo retaliation and the Democrats favoring more spending and loss
reliance on massive retaliation to meet all military emergencies. One
of the chief reasons for this upsurge in tho debate was the fact that
1953 was an election year, causing both parties to clarify their positions
and attack eaoh other. The Republicans naturally hagan to defend the
administration's policy, while the /emocrats tended to attach them. In
the non-partisan area, the tightening of tensions in Lebanon and tho
Formosa straits caused don. ress to take more notice of the possibilities
of limited wars, and thus Congressional opinion, aspeoially in the Senate,
7
Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 1066B-71.
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began to favor the build-up of forces necessary to fight limited wars and
to improve the defense establishment of the United States in general.
In Xuy of 1958 the Senate Preparedness .subcommittee Issued a seventeen
p int program for decisive action in the area of defense, This program
was arrived at on a non-partisan basis and was signed by both ^enocratio
and Republican members of the oommitteo. These points were detailed and
covered all areas of defense. The program is as follows i 1) the modernisa'
tion and strengthening of SaCj 2) step up in the dispersal of SAC bases
i
3) more effort in developing anti-missile missiles; 4) improvement of
the early warning c; stem; 5) modernisation and strengthening of the
ground and naval forces; 6) adequate airlift for ground foroesj
7) a {.-rsater anti-iubraarine warfare program; 9) greater production of
Atlas, Thor, and Jupiter missiles <tni accelerated development of the
Titanj reduction in the lead time in tho development of weapons
systems; 10) freer exchange of scientific and technological information
among nations of the Free Y»orld; 11) development of a rocket motor with
a million pound thrust; 12) more shelters and greater stockpiles for
civil defense ; IS) reorganisation of the structure of the defense
establishment j 14) increased incentives for tho retention of trained
personnel in the armed services; 15) acceleration of all research and-
development programs; 16) more devs I orient of manned missiles; a:;d
17) acceleration of the Polaris missile system.
9 Of particular importance
for limited war were the provisions for modernising the Army, *>avy#
and
Marines, an.: providing for more airlift. As will be shown later, all
I
-onrresalonal Record, Vol. 104, pt. 6, 85th Congress,
2nd Session,
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those ftltm mm incorporated in the dofonse appropriations bill for
the fiscal year 1969 by Congress. Thus, this program became the program
of the Senate toward national defense, since the defense bill was
supported by every Senator who voted.
The concept of limited war also received a boost by the Senate
Armed Services Committee. In its report cf July 30, 1958, the Committee
indicated thut the country needed a greater liiaited war capability in
view of the existence of the nuclear staleuate:
The committee feels most strongly that the Department
of Defense should maintain a greater vigilance in establishing
"limited war* capabilities* It seems obvious that if the
world's two greatest powers reach a nuclear stalemate wherein
differences between them cannot be resolved axoept by resort
to total war, then the situation may well indeed be similar
to thut described by the phrase, nof two scorpions in a
bottle," i.e., mutual annihilation. If one assumes that
nuclear stmlaruu/te c:-.n be roaohed, one must also assume that
the Soviet Union would then be free to a ain exercise the
advantage of its groat superiority in numbers and interior
lines of oonimunication and that it could proceed to disrupt
the world by piecemeal tactics, subversion, and other
pressures backed by the presence of its conventional forces...
In light of this the committee cannot holp but wonder
why the Army has placed such a reut emphasis on fixed
defense (point) weapons systeros which the Committee believes
has Ouused a dimunition of the Army's ground combat capability
(its principal and most important mission). The Committee
believes the Army should take stock of itself and shall re-
direct its efforts toward providing tho U.S. with the finest
forces in the world capable of victorious sustained ground
combat...
tfe must place greater emphasis on our striking power
and limited war capabilities. >e must take decisions to
eliminate duplication U defensive weapons systems, and
the defensive weapons system whio . we retain should not be
designed in the futile attempt to obtain 100 percent defense 10
but rather in insure the security of our striking capability.
Congres sional Record
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This report is interesting in that it ohastiees the ^rmy for not devoting
enough of its own funds to modernisation rather than to continental
air defense, thus pointing up the faot that much of the Anay»» problem
may be internal. Furthermore, this was the second report by a Congressional
Committee on the inadequacy of the nation's defense forces. And like
the former report, the 1S58 Senate Preparedness Subcommittee report,
this one was also signed by both Republicans and democrats.
Although these non-partisan reports indicated that not all of Congress
was satisfied with the country's defense forces and that the Lebanon
and Formosa affairs were having their effect with regard to limited war
forces, the debates following these reports became highly partisan and
were influenced largely by the coming off-season election. Senator
John Kennedy (D,, Mass.) opened the debate on national defense with a
aajor speech on August 14, 11-68* This speech showed diere most of the
Democrats in the Senate stood with regard to defense. If first outlined
the world situation facing the U.S. and the Soviet '-nion and then des-
cribed the threat posed by the Communists, lie stated!
•••One of the key premises upon which our leaders of
diplomacy, defense, and public opinion have eased their
policy t:-! inking, ••has been, since Hiroshima, our nuclear
power. We have possessed a capaoity for retaliation so
£:r«at as to deter any potential aggressor from launching
a direct attack upon us. Spokesmen for both parties, in the
S«nate and elsewhere, have debated our preparedness upon
the assumption that this "ultimate deterrent 1 would deter
any Soviet attaelu». Posses sion of siailar striking power by
the Soviet ^nion has not altered this basio promise — it is
instead described now as the result of a "nuclear stalemate*"
a point of "mutual saturation j" or a Glance cf terror,"
In the years of the missile gap, the Soviets may be
expected to use their superior striking ability to achieve
their objectives in ways which may not require launching
an actual attack* Their missile power will be the shield
from behind whloh they will slowly, but surely, advance,—
through sputnik diplomacy, limited brushf lro wars, indirect
noncvort agression, Intimidation and subversion, internal
revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the
vioious blackmail of our allias. Tha periphery of the Vrea
World will slowly be nibbled away, • .Each such Soviet move
will weaken the mestj but none will seem sufficiently
significant by itself to justify our initiating a nuclear
war which night destroy us. ••This may well be the most
important throat to the United States
.
In order to counter this threat. Senator Kennedy indicated that more
air tankers, air-to-ground missiles, atomic submarines, solid fuels,
Polaris and Minutoman ICBM's were needed. He also attacked the
airlift oapaoity of the services by stating that "it should be obvious
from our Lebanon experience that we lack the sea and air lift neoessary
to intervene in a limited war with th« speed, discrimination, and ver-
satility whioh may well be needed to keep it limited — and without
12
weakening our ultimate retaliatory power," The speeoh was hailed
by Democratic Senators Symington, Jackson, ilanafield and Hill, but
opened the way for partisan attacks by the Republicans in an outburst
that had bean completely absent in 1957. The rebuttal was started by
Senator Homer Cape-hart (*., Ind.) who brought up the issue of partisan-
ship and sot tha tone for further rebuttal by the Republicans. In
effect, ha said that *.. .there is a oonoerted effort on the part, not
of all Senators, but of a few Senators on the opposite side of the
aisle to discredit, 100 peroent, tha President. of the United States i
to sell our Defense Establishment short j arid to make statements whioh,
in ay opinion, oould give comfort to the enemy because they are con-
stantly repeated."13 lie went on to blame the Democrats for any short-
1 1Cs^ressioxwl Record , vol. 104, pt. 14, 35th Congress, 2nd Session,
August 14, 1958, pp. 17 bo9-7 1
.
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comings in national defense, and this thame, as well as hie Plsa to
•top "•oiling our defense* short." was taken up by other Republicans.
Senator Leverett Salton.tall ft** Mass.) voiced this sentiment by
saying*
•••Let us not sell ourselves short. The Soviets may be
ahead of us in some developments. But when soma persons
base their conolusions on estimates of Russian efforts,
as compared with our efforts, when actually the Russians'
are merely estimates anu are not hard, certain evidence,
then I am worried. There is a great coal of difference
between making a Judgment based on estimates of what wo
think the Soviets are doin& and making a judgment based
on what we know they are doing...
fie must strike the proper balance between the weapons
of the future and the weapons we need today. We cannot
hope to oonoentrate on eaoh year's military weaponry to
the same extent that the Russians, if they choose to
attack us, can concentrate on the weaponry of the one
particular time they nay select for attack.
The thesis behind the Saltonstall speeoh was that existing forces should
be built up before going on *o more advanced weapons. In this respect
he was also following the views of the Senate Armed Services Committee
and several i^emoorats. His dosire was to strike a balanoe between
present and future weapons, but where he and the Democrats differed
was over the fact that he felt that this balanoe had already been
achieved, whereas the democrats cid not think so.
Senator Kennedy's attack on the country's airlift capacity for
limited wars was oountered by General Twining (see page3cf ) and
by Senator ^resoott Bush (k.. Conn.) who felt that air lift in Lebanon
was not a problem and that we actually had an abundance of air and sea
lift for troops. ** Senator Frank Barrett (R., iVyo.) launched a speeoh
^Congressional > .core, vol. 104, pt. 15, 85th Congress, 2nd Session,
August ?1, 1358, pp. 18887, 18889.
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praising administration polioies, acting Its "magnifioent accomplishments,
"
end expressing tho opinion that we should place cur chief reliance for
defense upon manned aircraft, ballistio missiles, SAC airborne alerts,
anti-mlsalle alssllea, the Polaris, and early -earning: sy stems j but lie
made no mention of the Halted war threat or the need for forces to
raeet this threat.18
Many of the same opinions cere exprosed in the house, although they
were not ae heated. There were even disagreements between members of
the Republican party, while the Democrats held virtually the saiae
opinions as their colleagues in tho Senate. One of the few Republicans
to recognise the need for adequate limited war forces was Rep. Francis
Dora (R., N.Y»). He emphasised the need for these forces as well as
deterrent foroes oapable of dealing a "certain deathblow" to any aggressor
felt that limited war was becoming more likely and forces were needed
Lo counter this throat, iie did not specify economising on the budget,
17
nor did he attack the Democrats, the main administration critios.
Nevertheless, Sepa. William Bray (R., inc.) Timothy i>heehan (R., 111.)
followed the line set forth by Senators Saltonatall and Capehart. They
attacked the need for the apendlng of more funds and oountered enator
Kennedy's speech, *r« Bray defended the administration by saying:
The Army is being reorganised into a ^ntomic structure
that allows small but heavily armed, highly mobile forces
to operate over a great territory without support from
other units.
16
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We do have today the oapaoity to launoh a nuclear war
If that necessity ever confronts us. We have the capabilities
of protecting American interests in a limited conventional
war... 18
The administration wus also defended by Mr. Sheohan who blamed any
failures in defense on the Truman administration, thus conducting a
purely partisan attack upon the Democrats.19
Thus, in Congress 1968 was a. year of charge and counter-charge
with regard to defense policy. There were several different opinions
expressed, as this melange of statements and speeches Viae shown j yet a
general attitude favoring an inorease in limited war forces as well as
other elements of defense was beginning to grow. The Republican cry was
"Let us not sell African short," and as this was an election year, the
party vociferously defended administration policy (especially in Lebanon
and :uomoy) and warned the Democrats to use caution in their attacks.
On the other hanu, the Democrats used the defense issue as a tool in
their campaign to increase their majorities on both Houses. However,
the reports of the Senate r'reparedness Subcommittee ami the Armed Services
Committee showed that Congress was beginning to take an increased interest
in defense, and the need for a larger defease force wus starting to
take hold due to the events in Lebanon and Formosa.
The 86th Congress was essentially a Democrat ic Congress, as the
Democrats inoreased their majority in each House (S4 to 34 in the Senate
and 280 to 152 in the House). The Democrats began to increase their
efforts to appropriate more funds for defense. Looking ahead to the
Presidential eleotion in 1960 the Democrats increased their attacks
upon the Eisenhower administration, and in the struggle they finally
18
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adopted (at least in the Senate) an attitude very favorable to the
build-up of more adequate forces to fight limited war and thus
generally agreed with the attitude of the Army and Navy toward this
need* Passive retaliation became one of the prine targets of Demo-
cratic attacks on administration policy
»
Senator ftubert Humphrey (D* # Minn,) opened the democratic attack
in February of 1959 with thai following statements!
By now we should understand the folljj of narrow,
doctrinaire thinking and planning in the field of national
seourity. The idea that Communism could be oontained by the
threat of T,rnaseive retaliation" bso^uae an absurdity almost
as soon as it was advanced* Yet how much of our present
military budget is still a hangover from those days?
Until the day when the first sputnik went up, we per-
sisted in happy ignorance, in believing that w© held an
unshakeable deterrent in the foria of our strategic
i^ir arm*
Vtfe are persisting yet in believing that because we
possess a large family of taotioal nuclear weapons,
we have an effective deterrent against the employment
of Communist ground forces. The "&ore sang for a Buck"
slogan, ••still distorts and tv/ists the thinking of those
who hold the military pursestrings in the administration.
Yes, net even the ^banon and foracsa straits crises have
produced any concrete demonstration that the top levels
of the administration realize that the convsntional
forces are fast rebounding to the center stage.
•••Among the two great gaps. ••in our national armor
is the failure to maintain even a fraction of the modernized,
mobile, but conventional forces needed to detar Communistic
conventional probing and attacks.
These statements Bet the theme of the Democratic attack on the admin-
iBtration for holding back limited war forcos. This attitude was
repeated by Democratic Senators Lyndon Johnson, Russell Long, Paul
Douglas and Riohard Russell, who attacked the administration action
Congressional Record , vol. 105, pt. 2, 86th Congress, 1st Session,
February 17, 1959, p. 2507
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of impounding funds voted by Congress for defense. Republicans in
response to the6e critioismv did not defend administration policy
but warned the Democrats to use restraint when dealing with the subject
of military strategy, for such statements would seem to make them
22
military experts when, in fact, they were not.
Nevertheless, the Democratic onslaught continued. Senator John
Stennis (D. t Miss.) deplored the administration action of cutting SIRAC
by one division, 28 and Senator Mike Monroney (D., Olcla. ) said he was
...alarmed at the growing evidence of the administration^
negleot of our conventional ground forces.. I submit that not
only do wo lack adequate foroes to meet local emergencies,
but we are not developing the airlift capability required
to insure that we o±n rapidly and efficiently apply con-
ventional forces at points of danger. #A flagrant example
of the failure to appreciate the importance of our military
airlift potential is the postponement of the tactical air-
lift exercises — due to Iftok of operational and maintenace
funds in the MATS budget. *
These attacks were a concentrated effort by the Democrats who thought
that the administration had to wake up and heed the advice of Congress
which constitutionally had been given the right to raise armies and
support them.
Although the Republicans generally supported the Eisenhower policies,
they did agree with the Democrats that the defense establishment had to
be expanded. This, they agreed, would cost more money, dut they felt
that the funds could come from economizing in other programs such as
cutting out waste in foreign aid, eliminating the creation of more
gevernmeAt agencies, programs and functions not concerned with survival,
21Ibld », pt. o, ^arch 9, 1959, pp. 3502-06,
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economising in government activities, postponing all but urgently
noeded roverament programs, stopping the waste of funds by the services
th«a»elves, enforcing present tax rates, and increasing ^coac rrowth.
In this respect both Democrats and Republicans agreed. Senator Paul
Douglas even cited examples of waste in procurement by the armed services.
H© cited a survey by the House Committee on Government Operations which
Showed that of the H4 billion of property owned by the armed services,
$14,5 billion was for operating purposes and $12,1 billion to mobilize
the reserve in case of -.far. This left v!7 billion as surplus rhich the
armed services could put to better use in missiles or modernization, 25
Furthermore, as the next chapter will show, Congress has appropriated
more funds than the administration for the arm-ad services in an effort
to build up the country's defense fores s in all area.
In the House, the preparedness debate followed auoh the sane pattern
as it did in the senate, The Democrats argued for more spending and
criticized administration policy* the Republicans culled for balancing
the budget and defended the administration's policies. However, on the
subject of limited war and the forces to combat them, there were sharp
disagreements in both parties with Ijmocrats and Republicans ofter. taking
the same side, as was the case in the Senate, partisanship 3nter«d the
debates in the House, Ih© sharpest exchange occurred between Reps.
DanUl Flood (D. # Pa.) and Frank 3eoker M.Y.). In Rep. Flood's words;
In the face of tho increasing Soviet threat, the
administration suffers from a case cf aggravated complaoenoy.
l'he administration is meeting the mounting critioality of the
situation with a bland diet of daydreaming and ?fishful think-
ing and unwillingness to come to grips with the everpresent prob-
lem that refuses to fade away,...It is a gross disservice to our
2SGongressicnal Rooord, vol. 105, pt. 5, 86th Congress, 1st Session.
April c2, 1553, p. 6455.
nation.. .that this offensive of Soviet threats and grim pro-
nouncements of America's forthcoming doom finds its primary
rosponse by tho Eisenhower administration in a rising chant
of what I tern phony economy.
He thus felt that the administration was not making the necessary
preparations for the conduct of limited ?mr. Hep. Becker countered this
by claiming that the Lemocrats were too concerned with military prepara-
tions for defense and were ignoring the need for defense against the
total Communist throat (military, political, economic, and social). He
then blamed the Democrats for tho failure of the B-36 program, the delays
in tho H-bomb and missile programs, and outbacks in military personnel
in all the services. Tho most partisan statement of the session came
from Rep. Stephen Berounian (&., N.Y.) who said that the Truman adminis-
tration rspent more for peanuts between 1947 and 1952 than it did on
intermediate and long-range missiles." 25 Although these remarks were
highly partisan they did not reflect the attitude of the whole House,
and often Republicans and Democrats joined sides.
The sharpest division of opinion over defense policy came of the
discussion of limited war and the forces needed to cope with these wars.
Democrats such as Clarence Cannon and George Mahcn were against the
buildup of limited war forces. &r. Cannon attacked the build-up of
manpower in ths Array and the construction of more carriers for the Navy.
In his opinion tho majority of funds should , o for more missiles and
submarines* Rep. Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
26 Ibid
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issued the following report and warning*
We need to continue, ae we have in recent years , to
faoe up to the etark reality that the issue involved is
the survival of the United States. Preparation for
limited war is neoe*«ary.
. .and such effort is proceeding,
ihere are sane weaknesses. We do not have enough mobility.
V| provided some mobility funds above the budget last year
to cope with the same small war threat. Yesj preparation
for limited war is proceedings But to emphasise preparation
for limited war as top priority consideration is to invite
disaster, is to invite general war.
Adequate preparation for total war is the best possible
deterrent to limited war. This is true because of the
great danger that any limited war of consequence may very
probably expand into general war.
Is it not true that if we are able to cope with all
the aspeots of general war the chances are we will be
able to meet the limited war threat?. • ..V/e have an Army of
870,000 men trained in versatile types of military procedure.
He have a Navy j we have the Marine** We have amphibious
landing capability. We have 25 active carriurs. We have
'the Tactical Air Force* Wo have troop carrier aircraft. We
have a variety of weapons designed to be useful in general
war and in limited war*
Let us makfc sure we are reasonably well prepared for
limitea, war, but lat us make it even ::iore oertain that
beyond peradventure of doubt that we have the ability in
great abundanoe to detar global war and to cope with
the eventuality should sugh a war be forced upon the...
people of this. . ..Nation.
This attitude received Republican support from Harold Osteray of tferw York
who believed that as long as TVe maintain a retaliatory force of unquestion-
able power, it is believed that no possible enemy would resort to an
all-out attaok upon the U.S**5* Refutation of thi* position came from
Republicans and Democrats alike. Republicans Gerald Ford of Michigan
and William Bray of Indiana supported the need for more forces for
30
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for limited war, ©specially now carriers. Mr. Bray expressly oautioned
against the use of massive retaliation forces for limited war and warned
that conventional forces had to be increased.32 Demooratio support
came from Reps. £d Edmondson of Oklahoma, Woy Anderson of Montana,
xncl . r.iel Flood of Pennsylvania.
Thus in 1959 the House seamed divided on the issue of limited war
while the Senate stood more firm for the implementation of a policy to
increase the oountry's limited war capacity. Also, the period 1957 to
1959 showed an increase in the tempo of the debate over limited war.
This was ouused by the Lebanon and Formosa inoidents, sputnik, the
eleotion of 1958 and the Presidential election of 1960. Generally
the Democrats in the Senate favored the increase in limited war foroes
while the Republicans remained non-committal but went along with the
Democratic majority. In the House, opinion was more divided, with
Demoorats and Republicans often joi'hing sides. However, as will be shown
in the next chapter, the general attitude in Congress was favorable to
limited war and to the inorease in defense forces. While this chapter
dealt with words, the next vrill deal with deeds.
Ibid., up. 9G05 and 17619.
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Chapter V
The Debate on Limited War
Congress, the Administration, and the Budget
Chapter III hue shown that since 1957 the Administrations 1 attitude
toward limited war and the foroes needed to oope with, such wars has
not been very clear, but has at tines seemed favorable. This has been
shewn by statements made by ?resident Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense
MoElroy, and other Administration officials. However, this is only one
side of the picture. In order for these pronouncements to have any
weight attached to them, they have to be backed up by actual policy
decisions * To say that the country needs a limited war capability is
one matter j to provide definite measures to implement this policy is
another* 'hat will be shown in this chapter is that while the Administra-
tion has often agreed to the necessity of building up a limited war
oapability, it has tended to refuse to implement the policy to the satis-
faction of its critics, in spite of Pentagon and Congressional approval
of the policy* Moreover, the debate over military preparedness has
become a partisan matter with the L<*mooratic Con. ress demanding and
legislating an increasing amount of defense funds which include provisions
for building up a limited war capability (more troop transport), while
the Administration, believing the defense force to be adequate, has been
more concerned with balancing the budget and with reducing arms,
•specially those suiteu for limited war. The Administration still views
all-out war as the greatest military threat facing the country, and has
thus placed a greater emphasis on "push button' weapons, the cost of which
has prevented the development and purchase of conventional weapons
suitable for limited war purposes,
-ihile ^onf,ress, the Array, and Uavy
have also stressed the need for "pus- button" weapons, they hay© felt
that these are not enough to maintain an adequate defense posture.
Thus, they demand more funds for less massive weapons. The following
discussion will illustrate these points.
In hia annual budget message to Conereas in January of 1968 President
/ileenhower said. 'Amerioana are determined to maintain our ability to
deter war and to repel and decisively counter any possible attack."
<*>wever, "the greater increase in efficiency permit a further reduction
in the number of military personnel. Procurement of older types of
weapons and equipment is also !>einc reduced."1 Ihese two statements
set the trend for the Adniaistrations * defense budget for the fisoal
year 1959 (l July |lt>1 June 1959). it was a budget which showed a
greater reliance on push-button weapons. While planned expenditures for
troops anu conventional weapons, Including Jet aircraft, went down,
expenditures for miaailag and outer spaoe weapons went up. More than
75 percent of funds allotted to weapons procurement .vould go for
weapons not even in production. Of these funds 24 cents of every dollar
would o towards fissile production (as opposed to i cants in 1953 and
15 cents in 1957). 2 ''resident ^isenhower, however, did add a condition,
whereby, 'while great or attention ia ^iven in this budget to tho fore-
foin, areas (missiles, SAC), conventional warfare capabilities of the
military services are also being improved. For example, funda are pro-
vided to initiate prcduotion of new modela of amall arms and ammunition,
standardized for use by all mambers of the Jiorth Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion."^ Yet the Ansy waa the only service to be allotted less funds than
President -isenhowor, budget message, fcg ^:rk ilmea , January 14, 1958
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it had previously received,4 and thus was still a decade behind the Soviets
in bringing out new families of conventional weapons.
Aetually, the defense budget ($39,779,000,000) was a record for a
peacetime budget. This increase in military appropriations was justified
by President Eisenhower, as it was "necessary for a speedup in the
adjustment of military strategy, forces, techniques, and organisation to
lee? paoe with the rapid strides in science and technology. "5 *et, it was
a compromise budget - a compromise **botween a continual desire for a
budget as close to balance as possible and the satellite-induced need
for rr.ore military expenditures,.
. .between the need for strong operating
forces ready to fight tomorrow una the need for increased amounts for
future weapons,. •between the number of men and ships and planes and the
increased Mobility and firepower of recently developed weapons," and
"between various views of Russian strength..."6 ATiile it increased the
ocuntry's ability to retaliate against a massed nuclear attack: in the
present and in the future, it showed a continuing decrease in the country's
ability to fight limited, and especially non-nuol >ar, war. In fact, there
were only vague references in the budget message to the need for forces
to deal with limited wars. This can be best illustrated by expenditures
alloted to the Army forcing it to deorease its strength by one mors
division and 30,000 men, and the ^resident's supplemental appropriations
*fchile the Amy suffered a out of #163 million to a total of «8 billion
and the loss of one more dlvisonj the Air f-oroe rooeived $18.7 billion, an
increase if ; 295 millionj and the &avy received SjlO.S billion, an inorease
of 4273 million.
ft
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bill of April. 1958 for U.4 billion in added funas for missile, air-
craft, submarine, and expanding research in "high priority defe
programs
.
To highlight the partisan nature of the fight over the budget, the
House voted for a larger budget, one which, against Presidential desires,
would retain Army strength at 900.000 men. the National Guard at 400.000,
the Army Reserves at 300,000 and the Marines at 200,000. All services
were voted larger funds amounting to *212,614,000 more than the President
8has asked. The Democratic Senate moreover, passed a $40 billion defense
budget (41.6 billion more than the house had voted) ref looting a Congressional
doubt about the nation's capacity to fight limited wars while being able
to deter general war on the sum requested. The added $1.2 billion were
for Increases in missile-firing submarines, jet bombers and tankers,
and troop-carrying aircraft to increase ground mobility. 9 It was felt,
therefore, by Congress that any decrease in military manpower would weaken
the ability of the country to deal with small-types of aggression.
According to senator Dennis Chaves (D.. K.M.), "ths scientists with the
button will never erase the need for the G.I." 10 Later, this appropria-
tion was out by a Senate-uouse committee to only 4815 million more than
7The8e included the spaoe project, 39 more B-52's, 26 KC-155 jet tankers,
2 more Polaris submarines, flew York j-imes
,
*ipril 4, 1S58, _?;.. i :!
6
ftew *ork TLaes
,
Juna 26, 1358, p. 1.
Q
The SI. 2 billion included *638 million for 6 missile submarines,
$69 million for *^avy asssmlt craft, vlQ8.9 millicn for 13 more B-62's,
#11.2 million for 30 new jet tankers, and il40 million for troop transport
planes. i-tew York Times
,
July 31, 1958, p. 1.
10
Senator Chaves quoted in New Xork Times, July 51, 1958, p. 1.
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the President had requested, according to a Hew York Times analysis,
the ne* funds added by CongrosB were 'a true refleotion of the American
people's concern whether our military establishment Is really adequate
to meet the demands of both our own defense and of our farflung oonrait-
ments in the defense of freedom."12 Generally, it was agreed that Congress
had shown more wisdom than tho Administration in trying to provide a
budget which bdlanoed the nation's ability to retaliate against total
atomic war and its ability to cope with limited war to keep them from
spreading into *orld wars. Thus when Secretary of defease iofclroy admitted
that the Administration would frees e the #815 million in extra defense
iunde voted by Congress, strong oitioism was levelled at the Administrations
oonoept of national strategy. Two major oritioisms raised were that the
Administration was taking too great a risk in the U30 of future push-
button weapons at the expense of conventional weapons j and it was committing
the United States to the doctrine of massive retaliation without assuring
the ability of forces for limited war to carry out their missions. 15
The Administration responded to those oritioisms by deolaring the
United States had not lost its limited war capability, that even though
sttLnpower was being decreased, the Army and Marines would have greater
effectiveness due to greater firepower, ami, that although limited wars
^Kew York Times, August 7, 1958, p. 5.
*
*llgw York limes
,
August 9, 1958, p. IT.
1SKsw York limes, January 19, 1958, IV, p. 8.
were more deaireable than largo wars, it was the all-out war that was
more likely if tho two great powers oUahed. 14
It thus seeded evident that the Administration, in determining the
defense budget for the fiscal year 1859, MM more oonoerned with saving
money than with creating an adequate defense foroe, one that oould oope
with any war situation, ana although more money was being spent, the
increased money was non sufficient to offset rising costs. The adminis-
tration showed that, although modified, massive retaliation was still
the cornerstone of American defense policyi and in spite of the desires
of Congress for a more flexible military policy, the Administration
further committed itself to the view that by increasing the oountry's
ability to fight a general war, the capability to fight limited wars
would also be increased.
14
Ibid.
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The eoonoiay-mindedness of the iisenhovrer Administration .ms carried
over to the defense budget of 1960 in much the same manner that was
evident in the budget of 1959. It was to be a budget that illustrated many
of the features of the "New Look* policy of 1953 — a policy designed to
produee more powerful weapons in order to reduce military costs. Thus,
in a press conferenoe in November 1, 1958 President -dsenhower indioated
that the armed services could have their oostly missile systems, but at
the expense of existing weapons systems. Hi warned that these new weapons
would have to displace rather than supplement the existing systems in
order to prevent the rise of a "garrison-state " in which the military,
by using most of the economy, would be able to influence all political
decisions. He told newsmen, *we have got to do some good, hard-work
thinking on the thing, and not just pile one weapon and one system on
another and so in the Ion? run break ourselves. ° Lator that month
Secretary «*c£lroy voiced practically tha same opinion when he stated,
'what we've got to do now is to ma.<e a scientific judgment and appraisal
of program* that have become marginal in the light of increased knowledge
wlS
that ha 8 come from a year's experience with test programs."
Ihese statements Indioated that the defense budget for Fiscal Year
1950 would moan more austerity for the military. Although it would
probably carry an inorac.se in expenditures, it was believed that it would
oe just sufficient to ocver the increased costs caused by inflation and
the growing complexity of weapons systems. Because of this, both manpower
and missilos "would have to give."
17
Before the "resident's budget message
^President Elsenhower, press conference, New York Times , November 5,
1958 # p. 13.
^Secretary of Defense -ioiilroy, press conference, New lor-: limes,
November 29, 1958, p. 1.
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there were indications that he would seek HO billion in arms, a figure
ohallenged by the Democratic Congress, Senator Lyndon Johnson seened to
voioe the dominant opinion when he said that he was "deeply eonoerned
and somewhat disappointed to observe th*t in the field of military pre-
parations they (the Administration^ are programming as if they were
living in a static world rather than an exploding, expanding, and developing
••18
world," Thus, it seemed that Congress would probably "chart its own
course" in spending for missiles and limited war capabilities.
In his budget messago of January 1959, President -isenhovrer more
or less confirmed the opinions of many democratic congressmen, ^e
declared, "The objective of our defense effort today is the same as it
has been in the past — to deter wars, large or small. To achieve this
objeotive we must have a well-rounded military foroo, unuer unified dir-
ection and control, properly equipped and trained, and ready to respond
to any type of military operation that may be forced upon us. fle have
such a force now, and under this budget we will continue to have suoh a
force, To emphasise this now turn towards a more flexible military
force, the budget brought forth a new olatsif loation for the armed
servioes. Expenditures were broken down for a strate^lo foroe (SAC,
Atlas Missiles, tactical Army, Marine, and Air loroe units, mobile carrier
task forces, and Polaris submarines), an air defense foroe, sea oontrol
forces, and taotical forces ("tactioal elements of ground, naval, and
air forces to deal with situations short of -eneral *ar or to carry out
tasks in the event of general war')
•
20 ilowever, provisions for the
18
fc>onator Johnson, speech, New Xork Tines , January G, 1359, p. 1.
President Eisenhower, budget message. Mew 'iork Times , January 20, 1959, p. 17
^New York Times, January 20, 1S59, p. 17,
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organitation and use of these foroes was not indicated, nor were the
tactical foroes well-defined, and although it seemed as If the Administralon
had finally realised the need for suoh functional grouping, there was
no indication that it was anything more than a paper designation.
Ac was expected, the main emphasis of the budget was upon missiles
and long-range nuclear weapons, and although it was another reoord budget
($40,945,000,000) oalling for an increase in the long-range missile
systems, this was done at the expense of proposals to enhanoe the country 1 •
ability to fight limited wars. According to ^resident Eisenhower, "this
budget assures that essential defense needs are met. 1,21 This meant
increased funds for the Atlas and Titan ICBM's, Jupiter and Thor IRBM 1 *,
-ainuternan IOBM, and Solaris missil©3, satellites, lunar probes, and anti-
aircraft missiles — "the more advanoed and promising weapons systems."
i urthennore, beoause the armed services would have "signifioantly
greater combat power as new weapons continue to be added to inventories, nZ2
there would be no significant increase in manpower, but for the first
time sinoe the end of the Korean War there was no decrease in Army or
Marine strength, iiaoh service oven obtained more funds, although the
Anny felt that its share was not enough to allow it to start its five
year $15 billion modernization program. And, although the Amy remained
at fourteen divisions, the Strategic Army Corps was reduced from four to
three divisions, two of which were at full strength.
In summary, it was a budget which theoretically reduced numbers and
increased power j it was characterized by an effort to produce the maximum
from every defense dollar spent j it followed the 196S budget in formi
21
President Eisenhower, budget message, mm iork Times , January 20,
1969, p. 17,
22B
Ibid.
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it waa unacceptable to Congress *nd tho armed servioos.
Although secretary .'oi-lroy declared that the defense foroea wore
adequate anv! the oountry waa ia a position "not to fight the general
war, hut to he in shape to win it, so the othsr follow won't initiate
it," an.i that V© are in that position now and will bo in that position
for the years under discussion Ithrough 1962), thsre wore serious
doubts raised as to the adequacy of the budget. The first doubts ewce
from the Joint Chiefs of 3taf f via written memoranda to Congress stating
their reservations, Ihe greatest criticism, at was expected, cane from
General Taylor of the Any* His reservations to the budget centered
around funds for modernitat ion, the « ike-Zeus missile, parsonnel strength,
and the Array's surface-to-air missilj program. He waa particularly
annoyed at the lack of funds for tactical equipment and missiles, forces
needed to fight limited wars, as a result he felt that the Array would
be unable to carry out its assigned missions. The memoranda from the
flavy and tho Air tbroe were similar in their demands for more funds. It
must be noted, however, that all the other Chiefa endorsed the §40,8
billion oudgotj their reservations wore in rerard to the funding for varieus
4>art8 of their reapeotive aerrice program* 0 and it waa only the -rmy that
am* demanding an overall increase in funds. It also must be realiied that
Secretary of fefen** MoXlroy, *tew York limes , Jebruary 4, 1959, p. 3.
24Taylor, op, oit. , p. 66. General Taylor stated that in the area of
fund a for the purohuse of now equipment, which oontrola tha rate of
modernisation, the Air ioroe reoeived 60$ of all available resources,
the i%ry and Marine a 50;« and the Army 10>,
26
I6itt.
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these memoranda might have been
-resented for politioal reasons — to
try to get aore funds froa Congress,
further doubts were raised hy various senators, among; thea Jaoob ^avits
H.Y.),
-Ulan i^l lender (fife, I*.), and Sites Ksfauver {Kg Tenn.), who
ohided ^resident Eisenhower for putting budget values ahead of defense
26values* Later, the ^©nato took action against the Administration's
desire to out the strength of tho Amy and Marine ^orps by attaching
riders to the supplementary money bill deaandin the Marines be maintained
at ?00,000 and the Army at 900,000 by threatening to tie up all Army and
^avy funds unlass the wishes of ^ongress wore followed* 27 According to
••aator Paul Douglas of Illinois, this was no time to "reduce our capacity
to fight liaited wars." ?&
The House responded to this by actually cutting the Administration's
request for nerar money by one percent, although more money w*s given tc
the missile pro, ram and to the Ajnay (an added lUNf nil lion) for modernisa-
tion* * Although this was substantially the s&ma amount asked by the
President, there was a different emphasis placed on its distribution.
This was followed by tho Senate Appropriations -iostiittes request for a
^39*7 billion spending bill, placing a greater emphasis on both long-
range missiles and forces for limited warfare* Included were more funds
26
Hew fork limes , ^aroh lo, 1959, pp* 1 and 2* Hearings before the
Senate Preparedness subcommittee*
27
The riders were sponsored by ittko «*ansfield and Russell Long*
York Times
,
May 1, 1959, p* 2*
?8Senator Paul Douglas, fork Tines , May 1, 195S, ?. 2*
Hew Yora limes, May 50, 1959, p. U
82
to keep the Marines at 200.000, *nd funds for a nuclear super carrier. 30
The bill was unanimously approved by tho Senate and was *775 million
more than had been approved by the House. A compromise was reached by
the House and Senate cutting the bill to $59.2 billion, which was only
lift! million under the ^residential request, but with a greater emphasis
on Army and Marine ^orps. modernisation and long-range missiles.31 Thus
Congress was able to override budget estimates in order to ooncentrate
sore funds upon strengthening ground forces to meet the challenges of
limited, local wars, ana to place a greater emphasis on missiles. This
attitude also emphasised the growing battle between the Administration
and a Democratic ^onrress ever whether tho defense spending desired by
the Administration was for the right purposes.
The stated amounts were $380 million for the supercarrier, »43
million for the marines, and *400 million more for Army modernisation
and the Nike-£*tf* missile. I»ew Yor«c ii.aes, July 2, 1959, p. 9.
3l
inew *ork Times, August 1, 1959, pp. 1 and 7. The Air Force received
$17 billion, the Amy *9.3 billion, the Navy #11 billion and the Depart-
ment of Defense, &1.3 billion.
Thus a tawnd of austerity was establish by the .idministration with
regard to the defense budget. Although each budget was larger than the
one preoeding it, it was evident that the increases were just ably to
cover the costs of present and past bills allowing little to be left over
for the procurement of new arms and equipment. The causes of this .tore
;sany. There was the heavy hand of the Bureau of the Budget and the
Administration's desire for a "level budget, " Expenditure limitations
was place a on the services regardless of how much Congress decided to
fpend. An example of this were the funds withheld in the 1960 budget
to keep the Marine Corps at ?O0,OO0. These ceilings prohibited the
servioes from ^demising. There were ttlso inflation and past undor-
•stlnation of costs by the Administration which helped keep the budget
below the level sought by Congress and the armed services.
According to James Reston of the ^e.v ior.< f : cs, "the planners in
the .'entagon wore more interested in balanoing Russian power than
balancing the budget, but conservatives in the Administration are detor-
1 9
mined to keep it down. 1* The attitude of Secretary of the Treasury,
Robert Anderson and Secretary of Defense Neil -io'&lroy had been that a
sound financial base is needed for military security, hence the desire
to keep defense spending at a minimum. Furthermore, the Mminietration
had boon conducting a "peace program" and any arras build-up would tend to
destroy the image it had been trying to present. The Administration was
*Hew York Times, October 1, 1959, pp. 1 and 44.
5
Ja.n©8 Reston, hew York 'limes, November 13, 1959, p. 10.
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det.mlnBd to b. iwplrt a. tta party of pW0. .nd fl8Wl rs
sibility. This, of oourse. was in direct contradiction to >entagon
planners (except the Air toroe) who saw the need of carrying both a
strategic and a tactical force regardless of the additional cost.
Thua. in November of 1959 the Resident set a Hi billion ceiling
on the defense budget. He warned that the United States should be on
guard aot to spend money hysterically on new weapons. According to hin,
the country was "trying to do many things that are not completely necessary
*e said he would rather liquidate the national debt and develop a balanced
budget. It was evident that in the budget of 1961 there would be even
less funds for limited war in spite of Administration-expressed realisation
of their need.
In his State of the Onion message President Eisenhower painted an
optimistic picture of the country's defense forces as boing sufficient to
deter any arrressor from waging all-out war, and he declared that "to
meet situations of less than general nuclear war, we oontinue to maintain
our carrier forces, our many service units abroad, our always ready
Army Strategio Forces and -*arine Corps divisions, and the civilian
oonponents. The continuing modernisation of these foroes is a oostly
but neoeesary proooss, and is scheduled to go forward at a rate which
will steadily add to our strength."36 j
Theee two themes that military and economic strength <fre inseparable
and that the United states has sufficient general and limited war troops
1 1.1
.
Mibid. J
35
President
-iisenhower, press conference, Aew York Tjqee , December 3#
195G, p. 18.
36
,President Eisenhower, State of the Union -essage, New Yuri. Umes
,
January 8 # 1960, p. 10. •;. ]
and equipment were plainly evident in the President's budget message of
January It* I960. The ^resident proposed a $40, £96,000,000 budget which
provided for more battlefield rockets us well as IC33»e. yet was only
60 million more than the previous year's budget. As in the past.
President Eisenhower reiterated the need for forces able to meet all
contingencies. He said that;
•••strategy and tactics of the united States military
foroes are now undergoing one of the reates transitions
in history. The change of emphasis from conventional
-type
to missile-type warfare must be made with care, mindful
that the one type of warfare cannot be safely neglected
for the other. Cur military foroe must be capable of
contending successfully with any contingency that nay be
foroed upon us, from limited emergencies to all-out war.
To accomplish this object personnel strength wus to reraain the same
with 2,489,000 in the aotive service. Also, the functional designations
established in the budget message the previous year were a^.ain used.
Of special interest was the makeup of the "tactical re roes. ' e ^'resident
called for more funds for modernisation and improvement in the effective -
nes8 of these forces by improving the firepower and mobility of the
fourteen Army and three Marine divisions with more NATO ammunition-fired
rifles and machine guns, --GO tanks, &-113 armored personnel carriers,
self-propelled howitzers and a new family of other self-propelled
non-nuclear artillery, more battlefield missiles for close range fire
support, a thirty-five poroent increase in Army aircraft, more tactical
38
aircraft for the Air Foroe, and more ^rine Aircraft. Thus for the
first tine a Presidential budget message showed a disposition to build
President Usenhower, budget message, flew York limes , January 19,
1960, p. 18,
^President's budget message, jg Vork Times, January 19, 1960, p, 18.
up the country's limited war forces. This was further shown by the first
out (M| million) ever suffered by the Air Force, followed by increases
for the »avy ($112 million) the Army ($84 million). 39 Furthermore,
the outbacks made in the budget were suffered in the general war
capability area ~ the 3-70, supercarrier. and the Nike-Zeus missile.
Even though the budget seemed to tase notice of the oountry'e
need for limited war forces, as well as general war forces, there was
strong oritioism directed toward it because the increases made were
felt to be too modest. Although the percentages that go to the services
shifted slightly for the first tlue since the "Kew Look" in 1954,40
there was no major shift in allocations, and the increases made were
felt to be adequate again to cover only past and present bills. Also,
oriticism was directed toward the Bureau of the Budget for keeping the
spending oeilings oelow a feasible level. This was denied, however,
the Secretary of Health, education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming, who
stated, "I am convinced that Dwight Eisenhower will never permit any
considerations — including fiscal considerations — to stand in the way
of our continuing to deal with the foroes cf international Communism
from a position of strength rather than weakness.*41 The armed services
also expressed their dissatisfaction with the budget, although these
39
''"The Air Force still received the largest share, *18.6 billionj
the wavy 11.6 billion; the Army, 9.3 billion, and the Dept. of Defense,
1.3 billion. New *ork Tjaas
,
January 19, 1960, p. 2.
40The -rt.ray^ share cf the budget amounted to 23. 5> (23/b in 1959),
the "avy 30>£ (25> in 1959) and the Air Force 44?J (46j£ in 1959),
ilaneon Baldwin, flew York Timos
,
January 21, 1960, p. 9.
41
Arthur I'lemming, Mew York Times, February 13, 1960, p. 4.
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criticisms may have come from the pressure of competition for funds
rather than any genuine oritioism of the strategio polioy.
In keeping with its actions of the past two years, Congress again
proceeded to alter the budget without significantly changing the sums.
The House Appropriations Committee bill provided for more SAC bombers
in the air, more transport planes, and more nuclear submarines. This
might have been very significant had not the Administration suddenly
added an extra $1,5 billion to the budget to give more attention to
increasing the airlift. Army modernisation, maintenance to the National
Guard and Reserves, more F-106 interceptors, and more funds for the
Minuteman ICBM program.42 The final douse bill came to only *121 million
more than the ^resident had requested and inoluded more funds for planes,
submarines, satellites, army modernization. Later the Senate passed a
HO. 3 billion defense appropriations bill, a full billion dollars more
than the House had requested. The failure at the Summit conference and
the nsw tought line taken by :ir. Khrushchev seemed to have accounted
for such an increase. Aocording to Senator Dennis Chavez (D., H.M.)
who presented the bill to the Senate, 'There can be no price tag on
defense."43 These funds included $90 million more for Army modernization
and «i40 million to increase the Marines to 200,000 men. This overall
increase was subsequently out to *55C million by a Senate-House committee
which deleted the funds for the Marines and raised Army modernization funds
44
to , 200 million more than the original Administration request.
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Kew York Times, April 30, I960, p. 1.
43
Senator ENsnnis Chavez, Senate speech, New York 'i'imes , Juno 17,
1960, p. 1.
^i.'ew York Times, June 26, 1960, pp. 1 and 28.
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The study of these tnree budgets has pointed out many weaknesses and
problems faced by the nation's leaders in planning for a defense force
able to meet all contingencies, from local wars to all-out war. The
doctrine of massive retaliation lias to be a primary component of the
country's strategic concept, but, as has been pointed out, it does not
provide the total answer for the country's defense needs* Yet the
country*s planners are faced with the problem of providing funds which
will anable the nation to meet other limited war contingencies without
weakening; its ability to detor or fight general war
. The above discussion
has shown Congress to be willing to legislate funds to meet these con-
tingencies, while the Administration desires to maintain itself as the
"party of peace * and to present a "level budget" and thus has refused to
use the extra funds • The major area that has suffered from this dilesnxoa is
the area of weapons procurement* Many of the weapons of the Army, ^avy,
and Air Force used for conventional and limited warfare are rapidly
becoming obsolete without sufficient funds being available to replace
thesu.#ouoh procurement has to increase at a rate equal to personnel
roduotions oallsd for by the Administration, or else the Administration's
claim that troop reductions are being met by increases in mobility and
firepower will be a mere hollow claim.
Not only has the Army failed to receive sufficient funds for moderni-
sation and procurement of new weapons, but its mobility has been severiy
hampered by the Administration's refusal to allocate more funds for the
Military Air Transport Service and the Davy's amphibious fleet.
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The Administration has countered those criticisms by citing the
successes of the Lebanon and other operations which show that the nation
has a very considerable capability to "react with strength* to limited
threats on a Tory small scale. This may bo true at present, but it is
something to consider for the future when the increasing obsolescense of
the Army and i4arine f s equipment reaches a critical ]&>voi.
The other problem brought out by this study has been the partisan
nature of the debate itself. The Administration, striving for a balanoed
budget and a strong, stable currency and balance of payments, has been
determined to keep the budget within definite limits, while Congress, more
intent on actual defense values, has tried to raise it to take ear© of
all contingencies. Thus, while the Administration has ar'oaitted the need
for forces capable of meeting limited war threats effectively but has
refused to do anything about it. Congress has tried to sae that this
capability is realised. One thing is certain, however, The deterrent
policy of the Administration has been sufficient to prevent any "hot wars"
involving the united states from occurring up to the present time, and
without specific figures on the numbers of atomic warheads available, it
is difficult for the average Amerioan to say whether or not the funds
called for by the Administration are in reality insufficient, ^any of
the arguments offered by the oritios are partisan and often hysterical,
an-' thus tens;, to cloud the issues. However, if the views of the military
leaders themselves can be taken at face mlue, they indicate that the
services are deficient in thj area of modernisation, and this will pose a
grave problem for defense planners in the future.
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Chapter VI
Conclusion
The main focus of this study has been the roactionoof the Ariaed
Services, Congress, and the Administration toward the need to build up
forces to deal with situations short of all-out war, or limited, war. Thfe
does not imply the recognition of a ootrine of limited w*rj in fact, there
is a great difference between a doctrine of limited war and i capability
to deter or fight limited *ars. Henry Kissinger ( Nuclear '.teapots und
Foreign ?olioy) 9*4 vobert Osgood (Ljgdted ffar ) while calling for the
adoption of & strategy flexible enough to neet all contingencies, have
also demanded the inclusion of a definite doctrine of limited war in
American military strategy. This doctrine actually calls for the use of
fcf as an instrument of national polioy. according to Kissinrer, *it
is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our foreign involve-
zneiits that we should hare coae to consider limited war as an aberration
from the 'pure* case and that we have paid little attention to its
strate: io opportunities. Similarly, Osgood has stated that Ha the
use of anaed force as an instrument of national policy no greater force
should be employed than is necessary to achieve the objectives toward
which it is direated#*2 In this way the so-called doctrine of limited
war becomes an offensive strategy to gain specific limited objectives.
This strategy is entirely contrary to traditional American thinking, as
defense policy has always been of the defensive nature, and although the
^Kissinger, op. cit ., p. 117.
2
c,ood, op, cit
., p. 18
•
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President has the power to declare war, it would undoubtedly be politically
(and possibly constitutionally) impossible to declare war, If there
wore no specific case of aggreesion Involved. It is this characteristic
of the doctrine put forth by Kissinger and 08good that ls aomawhat object-
ionable and unrealistic as a definite policy to be followed by the United
States. As the leader of the free world and a ohampion of the principles
of tho United Hatione. the United States would be a hypocrite if it used
war. Halted or otherwise, to accomplish its airs. One if the principles
behind the United Nations is a desire to settle all disputes peacefully
without resorting to violence. The use of armed force to gain one's ends
except as a last resort or as an emergency measure would be contradictory
the principle and would thus cause the United States to lose stature
among its allies and its potential allies in the uncommitted bloc of
nations.
On the other hand, the maintenance of an effootive capability to
deter or fight limited wars implies a defensive strategy whioh is capable
to mooting limited forms of aggression, but not initiating aggression,
as is implied In the dootrlne of alasin~er and Osgood. Vhis type of
strategy is both politically sound and feasible, for It ocmplnnents the
strata^- of massive ratal iation and jives the United States an ability
to meet all situations requiring the use of foroe. It is this i'uetor
that has been the foous of this study,
:-ne of the difficulties that has developed from this study has
been the fact that it is hard to define just what constitutes limited war,
for in order to build up a capability, the definition of what it is the
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capability will deal with, mutt be determined. Ideally, a limitod war
hat been viewed a. a war confined as to area, targets, weapons, manpower,
time, and tempo, but is unlikely that so many Initiations oould be
imposed or maintained simultaneously. What is likely is that it would bo
limited mainly as to area and weapons. Still, a war limited as to area
and weapons oould take on a multitude of forms varying from guerilla
aotions to the clash of modern arms. It might result from Communist
•upport of indigenous revolutions, intervention of Communist "volunteers"
in a war between two small states, uirsot invasion across a well-defined
boundary, or wars occurring among small states that do not involve direct
Communist participation. 0 To bo able to re^ct to these varied types of
wars is the goal of a polioy whioh affords a flexible capability.
Thus limited war itself has come to take on a naw moaning. The
limited war of the 18th and 19th centuries is ontirclj different from
the limited war of the future. The wars of the 16th and 19th oenturies
were waged by all foroes and were limited as to technology, forces avail-
able, balance of power, and moral restraints. In contrast, the Halted
*ars that may occur in the future may not be limitod by technology, moral
restraints, and manpower i nor will they be used as instruments of national
polioy by all nations.
Ihis uncertainty about the form limited wars may take has led to the
problem of defining what constitutes • capability to deal with these wars.
The critics of the Administrations defense policies have maintained that
a flexible force is needed to meet those limited situations and still
maintain an ability to deter fcneral war. A wide range of capabilities.
Osgood, op. clt ., .». 237.
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it has been argued, would enable the United States to deter or fight any
type of war, and thus free other resource, for economic anrf social aid to
build up depressed nation.. In the word, of Secretary of the I** tfilber
Broker, "developing appropriate military strength to oope with the whole
apeotrum of thi* peril (the use of lesser forms of aggression by the
Communist*) Is not a simple matter of choosing between the ii-boab and the
rifle # Kathor, it is a matter of maintaining balanced forces oapable of
responding properly to all situations ~ those that require the il-bomb
or the rifle, or any othar situation in between."4 The Administration
has lon^ maintained this to be its policy; the difficulties have lain in
its implementation*
The adoption of a flexible policy is difficult beoauso its oonoept
is vague and therefore has led to the emergence of many different oonoepta,
all pur porting to aooomplisn the saae onds. The Amy has lonr maintained
that it offers the best moans to deter or fight limited wars ano therefore
it should get prime attention. Y t ".-hen thej bureau of the audgft initiated
a proposal to deprive the Ariay of its general war mission and bring back
at least two divisions from ovarsea* on the grounds that ainoo the Army
felt itself to be the ideal force for dealing with limited wars, it
should restrict itself to that by reducing its continental air defense
propram and overseas deployment for general war, the Army was outraged
and complained this would ohanf-e the Army's mission as set by law/
^reover, the Army has felt that it needs more divisions, fully armed and
trained, more speed and mobility, and more funds to replace obsolete weapons
and equipment. Indicative of the results achieved by the Army was
^Secretary of the Any >lilber Bruoker, speech, quoted in Mew York tij *es ,
November 15, 1909, p. 18.
fyew York 'lime a, fioveaber 15, 1969, p. 1.
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General Taylor's retirement as Chief of Staff in the middle of 195G. In
answer to the question of why ho retired, he stated; "For four years I
huve struggled to modernize the Army and my success was limited. So I
decided I would do one thing for the country and withdraw an obsolescent
general from the inventory,
The ^avy has also developed a concept to fight limited and general
war, and has even sided with the Army. The Navy vie»s itself as the Ideal
force for dealing with limited wars through its ability to transport and
support the
-U:-ii;e -Jorpa in limited war situations. This capability, it
ia felt, was proved in the Lebanon crisis. Also, its Polaris submarines
and super carriers could be used for both limited and general wars.
The Air f orce has taken the opposite view, that the prime deterrent
for any type of war is a nuclear retaliatory force capable of destroying
any possible enemy with a minimum of destruction to the United States.
Thus, the current military thinking may be divided into two views 1
The Strategio/tactioal view and the tactical/strategic view. ihe latter
is taken mainly by the Army and the Nav;, and most of Congress, while the
former view ia held by the Air Force and many Administration officials,
although there are different points of view within the services themselves.
The tactical/strategio adherents view future war as economic and political
penetration, possibly, followed by the use of force by the enemy to secure
limited objectives. For this reason they f««Jl that forces t«ained and
equipped to meet this threat are needed. The holders of the opposite
opinion view any future war as all-out with an air strike at the souroes
of strength of the West. Thus the United states will have to be prepared
General Maxwell Taylor, press conference, Hew York 'i'imcs , June 26 #
1S59, p. 8.
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to launch an anticipatory attack of its own or be prepared to retaliate
against tho first blow. The tactical/strategic adherents call for the
use of tactical nuoloar weapons j their opposite* viow only those weapons
of the highest yield as the most feasible. The tactical/strategic adherents
seek a sileaole troop life, the strategic-tactical group minimize it. The
tactical/strategic group asks for aircraft carriers; thoir adversaries,
submarines. Lastly, the tactical/strategic group sees the need for a large
defense budget to initiate a flexible policy, while the strategic/tactical
adherents desire to limit the budget by determining the best weapons
system and than putting all funds into its development. These coitfliotin,?;
concepts have ocaae about because of the increasing limits being placed
on the funds available to the services. As noted in Chapter IV, the
defense budget sinoe 1958 has increased only enough to cover past and
present bills and the results of inf iationi it has not been sufficient to
allow the services to develop all the programs which they desire. This
has caused a competition for x*unds which has caused conflicting concepts
to arise. As a result, it has been felt that the lower priority projects,
those for limited war, have been neglected.
Con, ress has generally taken the liberal viewpoint just discussed,
while tho Administration has remained in the middle of the road. Congress
has continually appropriated more money to build up linited war forces,
and the Administration has chosen to withhold them from use. ^resident
Eisenhower has maintained that by "concentrating our efforts on the more
advanced and siore promising weapons systems, we oun increase substantially
the corabat capabilities of our military forces with a relatively small
Gavin, op. cit., pp. ?50-2Sl.
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increase in the overall cost of defease, "
8
This implies a policy not tied
to one weapons system, but one which does restrict military spending —
one of the requisites of the liberals 1 proposals. The administration
has voiced approval of a flexible policy, but has chosen its own means
to implement it. It has leng maintained that the United States has
enough foroes for limited wars, and that the host way to deal with small
wars is to create allied foroes, 'principally ground forcos, numbered in
the millions, with a Creat capability. Thus, it is unnecessary to use
American foroes to fight these limited wars. This accounts for the
military aid to NATO, tttiN| CENTO, and OAS states. However, it does
not solve the problem of the unoommitted nations, some of whom have asked
for military aid and have not received it, as was the or.se in Guinea.
The difficulty to determining what constitutes an adequate limited
war capability has been increased by the appearance of nuclear weapons —
especially missiles. The Administration has placed a high priority on
nuolear missiles and the defense budgets showed them to have precedence
over other weapons systems. However, as of the budget for 1961, the
Administration provided missiles to be used on the battlefield, thus
subscribing to the theory that limited ground wars can be fought with
nuolear weapons of low yfeld. Even so, the ^rmy has been fighting what it
calls a stampede to produce ICBM*s anc ot,;ier weapons designed for nuolear
war and has called for a step-up in the production of conventional weapons
to counter the Soviet increase in conventional power — new tanks, self-
President -isenhower, budget message, New York 1'imes , January 20,
195S, p. 16.
8
Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarlee, quoted in New 'I'ork Tines ,
July 7, 1958, p. IS*.
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propelled guns, tracked rocket guns, mortars, assault amphibians, new
small aras^eto. 10 This attitute was looked up by a department of defense
report In June of 1958 whloh stated that, "Soviet military authorities
havo categorically rejected the concept of a conflict in which low yield
atomio weapons could be employed without aithor oombatent resorting to
the most powerful weapons in his arsenal. 1,11 Then there was the statement
of Hit Admiral Charles Srown, in which he declared. "I would not recommend
the use of atomic weapons no Matter how small, when both sides have the
1 ?power to destroy the world. * Thus, it has been argued that a build up
of conventional weapons is the best way to deal ?/ith limited wars; while
others, including the Aamini strati on, maintain that low yield battlefield
nuclear weapons are necessary to counter the larger number of ^omcamist
forces, doth sides agree that it is necessary to have a limited war
capability, yet neither can agree as to what constitutes an effactive
capability.
It is the doctrine of massive retaliation that has received the most
criticism in this debate* Henry Kissinger has noted that "if the Soviet
bloc can present its challenge in 1 ss than all-out war, it may gain a
crucial advantage, kvory aov3 on its part will then pose the appalling
dile;nma of whether wc arc willing to oomait suicide to prevent encroachment,
none of which seems to threaten our existence directly, but which may be a
13
step on the read to our ultimata destruction.' Ihis same opinion was
also voiced by Governor Robert ^yner of ^ow Jersey who stated* "Whenever
Bcw York limes , December 2, 1957, pp. 1 and 20.
^New York -^imea , June 8. 1958, p. 19
•
12
[/ioe Ada. Charles 3rown, speech, quoted ia Sew York Times , October 8,
1958, A< 12.
lv
I*t>in, or, o,.». eit ., p. 11.
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the Soviet union or one of its satellite states is willing to undertake
the risks of military aggression, direot or indireot, we cannot any longer
afford to b<; in the position of having no ohoioe exoept to run for cover
or risk blowing up the entire world."14 These oritios have implied that
the doctrine of massive retaliation offers only two alternatives in the
oase of Soviet agression. This seems to be an unjustifiably criticism,
as the iobanon crisis and the Quemoy incident did not result in either
the United States running for oover or starting a nuclear war. Further-
more, an armed force (excluding reserves) of 2.4 million men indicates
that there are troops available to fight limited wars, tthat these
oritios have failed to see is that while higher priority has been ^iven
the nuolsar retaliatory force, other forces have remained in being to
cope with other possible situations. This is not to say, however, that
the doctrine of massive retaliation does not deserve criticism. By
placing so high a priority on the nuclear retaliatory foroe, the Adminis-
tration, although maintaining a large foroe, has not been able (or has not
felt it neoessary; to provide sufficient funds to replace obsolete
weapons and equipment used by the armed forces. Only if this is done,
can the Administration truly admit that its strategy is one of complete
ilexiUlity. In order to accomplish this task, either of two alternative!
must be followed, either the Jtu4ida for the nuclear deterrent be cut
down and the funds thus freed used to build up the capability to deter
or fight limited wars, or the budget be increased to accommodate the
modernization program, either alternative will meet criticism, but the
Gov. Robert iieyner, speeoh quoted in Hew York ^iaes
,
April 24, 1969,
p. 14.
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modernisation program has to bo accomplished if the tactical foroea are
to bo a realistic element in the future.
Thus. th-i main theme behind this study is not that the linited States
must adopt a policy which favors the use of limited war as an instrument
of national policy, but that the administration just realistically view
itw own strategic doctrine in a proper perspective, for, although it has
aaintained that our strategic doctrine is flexible, it has in faot failed
to implement this policy to provide for adequate capabilities to meet
all type* cf possible military aggression. actually, the administration
has a choice between two contrasting military postures, each of which is
expensive. "The one, concentrating upon strategic air power as the
deterrent, would economise on tactical arras j th-s other, stressin • . . I -
capability deterrent, woul . economise on air defense for our civilians."15
oy outtin;: down on the huge costs of protecting A-ioriean cities anc using
these funds to protect SAC bases adequately and develop tactical foroes,
an adequate deterrent would result, furthermore, the Administration
will have to take measures to prevent >vars from spreading outside the
1A.T0 area, and to b^ prepared to fight smaller wars in the Middle 3ast
and the Soviot-Sino periphery (Iran to Korea). This would entail added
grounc; foroes, new and diversified low-yield nuclear weapons, new ground
and airborao equipment for mobile, tactical operations, an adequate
system of conventional weapons, the maintenance of strategic retaliation
capabilities, and forces for total war. This would comprise a truly
flexible military policy, one which provided for a capability for fighting
both all-out wars and limited wars.
Malcolm hoag, 'Cost cf a dual capability, vrananoe, vol. XLII,
March-April, 1968, p. 324.
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